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The United States advocated a strong and cohesive pro-European-integration policy from 1945 
through 1968. While there are many motivations behind this pro-integration policy, the overarching 
objective was to create an integrated Europe that was strong enough to be independent of American 
aid, yet not so powerful as to threaten American preeminence. I analyze how the United States 
influenced the early stages of Western European integration and how its policy sought to ensure that 
any outcome would be advantageous to the achievement of American policy objectives. In general, 
the United States leveraged its dominant position in the post-World War II world order to create an 
agent through which it could achieve its goals. I argue that, from a long-term and broad historical 
perspective, the United States succeeded in encouraging its European allies to create a union that 
fulfilled its objectives: a closer internal cooperation, physical and economic reconstruction, a 
greater Atlantic orientation, and a supportive partner. To arrive at this conclusion, I have evaluated 
two case studies; the implementation of the Marshall Plan and American support of the European 
Defense Community, using the principles of strategic interaction and process-tracing in the 
Principal-Agent Model framework.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 At the end of World War II, the United States occupied the dominant power position in 
the Western world. This hegemonic status endowed the US with the task of rebuilding the rest of 
the West. Through this project, Washington oversaw the reconstruction of the West and was able 
to shape it, such that the resulting design fulfilled America’s vision for the post-War world. In 
particular, the United States chose to use its leverage to encourage the political and economic 
integration of Western Europe. This choice drove America’s foreign policy in Western Europe 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, and was especially prominent until the Nixon 
Administration’s investiture in 1969. Although the phenomenon of European integration has 
received much attention in the literature, scholars often downplay America’s role in this process. 
Yet, as Berend notes, the United States was:  
…the most powerful and influential among the initiators of the European Community 
institutions in the 1950s and 1960s and pushed the European Community enlargement as 
much as possible…it was the US government that virtually ‘dictated’ the Monnet-
Schuman initiative that set the [integration] process in motion (Berend 2016, 2). 
 
Given this substantial role, US involvement in the integration phenomenon demands analysis to 
understand both the process and the modern design of Europe. Therefore, I explore how the 
United States influenced Western European integration, such that any product would be 
conducive to the achievement of America’s domestic policy objectives.  
 Chapter 1 reviews the vast compilation of literature that has been amassed on European 
integration. Based largely on patterns found in the literature, I then justify the decision to limit 
the period of analysis to the years between 1945 and 1968. Finally, this chapter outlines a basic 
history of European integration. Chapter 2 explains the motivations behind the US decision to 
involve itself so heavily in European affairs for five successive presidential administrations. 
Chapter 3 will lay out a theoretical framework in which to consider the US-Western European 
relationship during this time period. This framework is then used in Chapter 4 to explore two 
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specific US policy programs, the Marshall Plan and American support of the European Defense 
Community. These case studies enable me to make claims about the influence of the United 
States on the integration process. Chapter 5 concludes this work, discussing the legacy of 
American involvement in European integration.  
Literature Review 
Many scholars have examined European integration and indeed, some attribute the 
phenomenon to the direct influence of the United States in European politics in the immediate 
post-War years. A strong base of scholars also claims that the United States sought to establish a 
specific construction of Europe: a confederation of states that would make a valuable trading 
partner, not reliant on American aid, but that would still be weak in the face of American 
political and economic dominance. The literature neglects, however, identifying any sort of 
model to examine the unique relationship between the United States and its reliant European 
allies in the post-World War II world. Additionally, past scholarship overlooks a study of the 
ways in which the US promoted this strong, yet subordinate, integrated Europe.  
European origins of European integration 
Western Europe was particularly troubled by its fall from world power after the Second 
World War and was eager to reaffirm its dominant position on the world stage. While the 
Europeans had many different motivations, most Western European governments came to the 
conclusion that the only way to ensure their return to power was through collaboration with one 
another. Many prominent European officials understood that even through integration, the 
damage to Western Europe was too great for independent reconstruction (Lundestad 2003, 23). 
Geir Lundestad (2003) demonstrates that the European states essentially invited the United States 
into their affairs to gain the necessary financial and military aid to rebuild. He argues that the 
United States did not force itself into the European integration process, but rather was asked to 
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play an active role. Lundestad highlights a variety of different reasons for this invitation 
including to serve as a mediator, guarantor, and military and financial lender in Europe 
(Lundestad 2003, 29). Although I do not dispute that the Europeans certainly needed the United 
States and often willingly included American officials in their regional affairs, I offer a different 
way to model this relationship, rather than proposing that the US was “invited”. This model will 
be further discussed in the coming sections. 
While Lundestad (2003) offers a European account of integration focusing on the 
American role in the process, Andrew Moravcsik and Sebastian Rosato consider the theoretical 
motives in Europe for a transition from nationalism towards integration. Moravcsik (2013) takes 
the liberalist approach, claiming that economic interdependence was the driving force. He 
postulates that national governments foresaw economic advantages of integration, and thus went 
about trying to manipulate and design institutions to accrue such advantages (Moravcsik 2013, 
18). Conversely, Rosato (2010) approaches the question of integration from the realist 
perspective, maintaining the balance of power explanation. He highlights the importance of the 
Cold War political environment under which integration began; Europe sought to balance the 
Soviets and the Americans in an effort to preserve European power and autonomy (Rosato 2010, 
2). Yet, both Rosato (2010) and Moravcsik (2013) consider integration only from the European 
vantage, ignoring the United States’ motivations for American involvement in their analyses.   
The United States’ Role  
While much of the momentum for integration came from a European impetus, the 
American motivations and mechanisms for supporting integration are critical in shaping the form 
that integration took. Past works primarily focus on the following American motivations for 
encouraging European integration: preventing the spread of communism, containing Germany, 
creating a strong trading partner, promoting the American way of life abroad, limiting 
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dependence on American financial and military aid, easing the distribution of this aid, 
demonstrating American dominance, and promoting peace and maintaining security (Lundestad 
1998, Ellwood 1992).  
Lundestad (1998) neatly separates the American motives for integration into five succinct 
categories: spreading the American model; encouraging a more rational and efficient Europe; 
reducing the American burden; containing the Soviet Union; and containing Germany 
(Lundestad 1998, 13). David Ellwood (1992) considers the early years of integration, devoting 
most of his book to the first post-War decade. He argues primarily from an economic 
perspective, discussing how a desire for larger and more efficient markets strongly motivated 
integration (Ellwood 1992). In constructing their arguments based on historical events, these 
scholars offer expansive accounts of the particular circumstances and actions leading to 
integration milestones. These works, however, do not present any theoretical explanations or 
models for the American involvement that they detail.   
The scholarship also highlights the mechanisms that the US employed to promote 
integration. Lundestad (1998, 2003) primarily emphasizes and analyzes the large and discernible 
American efforts such as the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). He demonstrates that the 
United States utilized these mechanisms to tacitly urge its dependent Western European allies 
towards integration and collaboration (Lundestad 1998). In his later work, Lundestad (2003) 
maintains that in both Western Europe’s implicit and overt requests for American assistance, 
Europe essentially handed the Americans the leadership role in governing its regional affairs. 
Rappaport (1981) emphasizes the role of the OEEC and the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in furthering integration, making specific mention of the United States’ role in these 
institutions. Ellwood (1992) also analyzes prominent American programs, such as the Marshall 
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Plan, demonstrating how these efforts introduced the US into Europe’s affairs. The specific 
techniques that the US used to try to achieve European integration are important, but equally 
important are the reasons why American policymakers chose to employ these mechanisms as 
opposed to other ones. Analysis of this underlying question is largely absent in these scholars’ 
works.  
Additionally, the scholarship ignores a crucial nuance in the American position: that 
“integration” in general would not have benefitted the United States. Only a construction that 
would ultimately create domestic dividends would be advantageous. Thus, Washington did not 
encourage integration in general, but rather a structure that would yield domestic benefits. 
Rappaport (1981) describes this particular brand of integration as “…a United Europe strong 
enough to defend itself yet not so strong as to threaten American economic or political 
hegemony” (Rappaport 1981, 121). Yet, these works, Rappaport’s (1981) included, ignore the 
connection between the motivations behind American support for European integration and those 
mechanisms utilized to realize this specific construction. Given this void in the scholarship, a 
comprehensive study of American influence on European integration must consider the basic 
motivations behind American support, as well as the mechanisms through which Washington 
encouraged an integration that would fulfill its objectives.  
Van der Beugel (1966) begins to address this problem, offering an in-depth explanation 
of the United States’ involvement in the integration process while also highlighting America’s 
interest in a particular type of integration. His recount references memorandums, specific official 
and unofficial meetings, and acute details of contemporary events, providing greater insight into 
real policy considerations. This detailed background explicitly demonstrates the mechanisms that 
the United States employed to encourage integration. The work’s major drawback is that, being a 
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contemporary piece, it lacks the advantage of hindsight and ends its analysis prior to the end-date 
for this paper’s review.  
Theorizing the US-European Relationship  
Another drawback of past works is their lack of any comprehensive theoretical 
framework. Although the European-centric works often provide a framework to consider 
integration, these models fail to include the US in their formulation. In its work to rebuild 
Western Europe, the US chose to abandon the imperialistic and divide-and-conquer strategies of 
the past. Instead, officials favored promoting unity and supranationalism (Lundestad 2003, 37). 
Given this marked break with historical strategy, the study on American involvement in 
European integration requires the development of a framework through which one can theorize 
about the new kind of relationship between the US and Western Europe. This thesis seeks to 
theoretically model this relationship using the Principal-Agent Model. Although political 
scientists have used this model in this past, their work has largely centered on domestic politics. 
In an overview of the model’s political science application, Miller (2005) offers a jumping-off 
point for considering assumptions and implications of the model in the political science sphere. 
For example, he highlights the model’s canonical assumptions in a political science context.  
Additionally, the model has been used extensively to consider delegation to supranational 
associations or international organizations. In Delegation and Agency in International 
Organizations (2006), the authors ask why states choose to confer a degree of sovereignty to 
other agents or organizations and to what extent and through what mechanisms are they able to 
control the organizations to which they delegate? They formulate a list of motivations as well as 
discuss strategies for controlling an agent, and consider under what circumstances these 
strategies might be successful (Hawkins et. al. 2006). This application is helpful in providing a 
conception of the model that can examine the reasons why and the methods by which the 
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European states chose to delegate some of their sovereignty to international organizations. Yet, 
the works using this application assume principals delegate based on their personal needs rather 
than due to external pressure (Hawkins et. al. 2006). In this case, this assumption would imply 
that the Europeans chose supranationalism out of their own desire rather than at America’s 
urging.  
In the context of the European-US relationship, however, the primary consideration is the 
United States’ decision to delegate authority over the integration process to the European states. 
In other words, this particular conception demands applying the model to interstate relations, a 
realm which the scholarship has largely ignored thus far. Anthony Marcum (2015) has done 
some work using the model, exploring why states choose to engage in military occupations and 
how they implement control and mechanisms for monitoring in occupied states (Marcum 2015). 
His work, however, offers a narrow conception of delegation in interstate relations. Since the 
United States chose not to directly occupy most of Western Europe, Marcum’s work does not 
offer a basis for theoretical analysis in this situation. Given the gap in the literature and building 
on Miller (2005) and Marcum’s (2015) setups, this project develops a framework for using the 
PA model in the context of interstate relations. Another hole to fill is the problem of multiple 
agents. The model’s prior political science applications have considered cases of multiple 
principals, but not multiple agents. The US-European relationship, however, features one 
principal but many agents.  
A Basic History of Integration 
 Before offering an overview of the integration process from 1945 through 1968, it is 
necessary to clarify to what exactly “integration” will refer. In the context of this paper, 
integration references the process of moving towards a closer collaboration between European 
states, both politically and economically. This increased cooperation implies a greater degree of 
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regional consideration in the development of national programs, a dismantling of economic and 
political barriers, and an abdication of some amount of national sovereignty to international 
organizations. 
In this work, I will not debate whether integration was achieved during this time period, 
since my interest is in the process itself, not a particular culmination. A basic timeline of key 
events in the general process is provided below in Table 1. The following section will detail the 
process towards integration, focusing on the specific events that are relevant to America’s role.  
TABLE 1 
 
June 1947 Announcement of the Marshall Plan 
May 1948 First Meeting of Hague Congress (Congress of Europe) 
April 1949 Creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
May 1949 Creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
May 1950 Announcement of the Schuman Plan 
April 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established 
May 1952 European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty Signed 
August 1954 French fail to ratify EDC Treaty 
December 1954 Western European Union (WEU) established 
March 1957 Treaty of Rome (EEC, EURATOM) signed 
 
Before the war even ended, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic believed that a closer 
collaboration between European states would be necessary to rebuild the region (Ellwood 1992, 
11). But in the immediate aftermath of World War II, between 1945 and 1947, Europe was far 
too physically, politically, and economically devastated to begin any meaningful process of 
reconstruction, let alone integration. The gross food and raw material shortages and the great 
decrease, if not temporary paralysis, of both Europe’s industrial capacity and labor productivity 
meant that during these years, Europe simply tried to survive (Van der Beugel 1966, 37). 
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America doled out emergency aid to ensure Europe stayed afloat. After the particularly harsh 
winter of 1946-1947, US policymakers started to recognize that preventing total economic 
collapse would require longer-term and larger-scale aid (Van der Beugel 1966, 38).  
In 1947, in the wake of imminent European disintegration, the United States announced 
the Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program (ERP). The Marshall Plan 
sought to rebuild Western Europe’s economy, with the goal of making it self-sufficient in four to 
five years. In addition to rebuilding the economy, the ERP spurred integration. The Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA), the operational arm of the Marshall Plan, furnished aid on 
the American assumption that the Europeans would work on a foundation of economic 
collaboration. The ECA further assumed that this economic collaboration would eventually 
evolve into some sort of institutionalized union of Western European states (Ellwood 1992, 83).  
 In 1948, the Europeans launched the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) to manage the influx of American aid. The organization was designed as a check on the 
individual national authorities and provided a collaborative forum. Although the OEEC did not 
have much real power, it marked an important step in the integration process by promoting 
cooperation of European states (Ellwood 1992, 157).  
 In addition to greater intra-European cooperation, the first years after the War also saw 
more collaboration between the two sides of the Atlantic. On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) was created. In terms of European integration and specifically 
America’s role in this integration, NATO served two purposes. First, membership demanded that 
the European states collaborate on matters of military security (Van der Beugel 1966, 252). This 
forced cooperation facilitated an alignment of Western European security policies. NATO’s 
second role was to enhance the European-American relationship by compelling North America 
and Western Europe to cooperate and collaborate on military issues. NATO both directly 
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included the United States in European security matters and enhanced the American leadership 
role. The European states were heavily relied upon the United States for the maintenance of their 
physical security. This dependence elevated the relative position of American superiority in the 
US-European relationship (Van der Beugel 1966, 253).  
 Shortly after the creation of NATO, in May of 1949, the United States, Great Britain, and 
France consolidated their occupied zones in Western Germany to establish the Federal Republic 
of Germany (FRG). While this move may not seem like much in the scheme of European 
integration, it represents increased cooperation of the two strongest and most outspoken 
European governments. The United States had initially hoped that Britain would lead the 
integration push from within Europe. The French, and General de Gaulle in particular, staunchly 
opposed a British-led integration (Lundestad 1998, 62). The two European powers were 
constantly at odds with one another and so their cooperation in consolidating the occupied zones 
symbolized a significant step towards European unity. Furthermore, the French initially firmly 
resisted any plan to rebuild or integrate Germany and instead preferred a strategy of defeatism 
(Lundestad 1998, 24). Consolidating the West German zones represents a degree of French 
acquiescence to integrating and reviving West Germany. 
In September of 1950, the OEEC created the European Payments Union (EPU) to ease 
the transfer of money in international trades. The United States was highly instrumental in the 
construction of the EPU. The idea was originally proposed by Americans and the US was the 
Union’s primary source of funds (Van der Beugel 1966, 203). The EPU represents another 
important move towards integration; it created a European currency area. In the context of the 
mass postwar dollar shortage, the multilateral system of currency transactions between the US 
and each individual European state was inefficient. The EPU rectified this problem, stressing the 
importance of currency balances between the US and the EPU members as a whole, rather than 
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bilateral currency balances between the US and individual European nations (Ellwood 1992, 
160).  
 Despite the French animosity towards Germany, the French were determined to harness 
the economic potential of their neighbor. In May of 1950, French foreign minister Robert 
Schuman announced his plan to consolidate French and German steel and coal production under 
a single authority. The Plan proposed the creation of a single market and, by pooling French and 
German resources, provided the first step towards a federation of Europe. The Schuman Plan led 
to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. As with the 
consolidation of the West German zones, this plan was a step towards linking Germany with the 
rest of Western Europe and a move away from France’s cynicism towards its neighbor. Although 
there was no official American involvement in the Schuman Plan negotiations, America’s strong 
endorsement, as well as the close personal relationships between American officials and the 
Plan’s architects, were significant in its development (Van der Beugel 1966, 244).  
 The years between the establishment of the ECSC and the signing of the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957 represent a turning point both in US-European relations and in the American role in 
European integration. Between 1950 and 1954, US policy evolved from supporting European 
integration in general to supporting a supranational construction, specifically (Van der Beugel 
1966, 249). Policy promoting the European Defense Community (EDC) characterizes this 
period. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 intensified the American sentiment that Europe 
needed to strengthen its own defense capabilities, including the rearmament of Germany. Both 
American and European officials, however, strongly believed that West German rearmament 
could not be safely achieved without integrating the reenergized state into the rest of Western 
Europe (Kunz 1953, 275). Additionally, at the time, the United States and Great Britain were the 
only states who could supply adequate conventional defense contributions to NATO (Van der 
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Beugel 1966, 274). US policymakers believed that some sort of European Army that pooled all 
European military resources would remedy these problems. This belief was embodied in the 
strong American support for the EDC, which became the cornerstone of America’s European 
policy (Van der Beugel 1966, 249). The realization of the EDC would have established a 
supranationally designed and European-led defense alliance.    
 Although the United States spent years vehemently backing the EDC and pushing for 
ratification of the treaty that was signed on May 27, 1952, in 1954, the French failed to ratify the 
EDC (Van der Beugel 1966, 298). While the US had often threatened an “agonizing reappraisal” 
of American policy if the Europeans did not ratify the treaty, this reassessement never happened. 
Shortly after the failure of the EDC, France proposed the Western European Union (WEU) to 
prevent any possibility of Great Britain and the United States rearming Germany without French 
involvement (Creswell 2002, 119). Although President Eisenhower did not look favorably upon 
this new solution, primarily due to its lack of supranationalism, the EDC’s defeat and the 
absence of alternative programs ultimately forced the President to support the WEU (Creswell 
2002, 120). While the American administrations continued to strongly support integration until 
Nixon’s investiture, after the US lost the EDC battle, American support was less direct and overt 
than it had been in the past (Van der Beugel 1966, 301).  
Their refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty was not the only obstacle to integration that the 
French posed. During his tenure, General de Gaulle repeatedly obstructed America’s attempts to 
achieve integration. The General wanted a form of integration that was led from within Europe, 
ideally by France. De Gaulle felt that the American plan put too strong an emphasis on the 
Atlantic framework. He favored a protectionist Europe, independent of the United States: a 
conception which stood at odds with American objectives (Lundestad 1998, 61).  
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The combination of the EDC failure, de Gaulle’s anti-American stance, the deterioration 
of the US balance of payments, and a growing trade deficit between the US and the EEC 
contributed to US policymakers’ decision to take a less direct role in European integration after 
1954. This indirect role generally consisted of igniting the American diplomatic machinery: 
instead of American policy overtly supporting any particular program, US officials worked in the 
background to secure victories for American preferences (Van der Beugel 1966, 308). 
Although the US no longer considered it prudent to publicly throw its opinions into the 
European arena, it still sought to support European-born efforts towards greater integration. In 
March of 1957, “the Six”; Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (Benelux), Italy, France, and 
West Germany, signed the Treaty of Rome, which formally established the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The United 
States generally supported the treaty and the foundation of these two collaborative European 
communities (Van der Beugel 1966, 309). In terms of US involvement in EURATOM, American 
support was vital to its establishment. In November of 1958, at European urging, the United 
States committed financial assistance, technical know-how, and an allocation of U-235 to 
Europe’s nuclear program (Van der Beugel 1966, 322).  Yet, concerning the EEC, American 
support was tempered compared to the past: the US began to acknowledge the potentially 
negative domestic consequences of an economically strong and united Western Europe. In 1962, 
the first real trade war between the EEC and the US unfolded. The US continued to support 
integration even through the trade war, but fear began to spread throughout the US: perhaps the 
EEC was not as Atlantic-oriented as policymakers had hoped (Lundestad 1998, 88).  
 In 1960, the OEEC was re-founded as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) with the US and Canada serving as full members (Ellwood 1992, 219). 
This transformation had many causes. The United States felt that the Europeans needed to be 
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responsible for a greater share of the world’s economic burden given their newfound economic 
strength and the faltering of the US economy (Lundestad 1998, 88). Additionally, the Euro-
centric framework of the OEEC was no longer adequate in the contemporary period; now, the 
world needed a broader forum to discuss common economic problems. The OECD symbolized 
an intensification of Atlantic cooperation by putting US policy on a level playing field with its 
European allies (Van der Beugel 1966, 348). 
 The transformation of the OEEC to the OECD was representative of the time period. The 
conversation increasingly centered on the need to develop an Atlantic framework and partnership 
after the election of President Kennedy in 1960. The United States no longer had a complete 
monopoly over the Western power structure. Thus, the United States needed to actively 
encourage Europe to orient itself towards the Atlantic to ensure that the US would not be left out 
of, nor hurt by, Europe’s continuous growth (Van der Beugel 1966, 353). The US needed to 
ensure that the new Europe that it had helped to rebuild did not now turn against its savior. This 
necessity guided American policy through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, marking 
the concluding policy program for this particular study. 
The First Phase of European Integration in America: 1945-1968 
 Capping the period of analysis between 1945 and 1968 aligns this work well with past 
scholarship. Klaus Larres (2009) maintains that there are two different stages of European 
integration from the American perspective. He claims that from the immediate conclusion of 
World War II in 1945 until the Nixon Administration took office in 1969, American enthusiasm 
for European integration was strong and pervasive. From Nixon’s investiture through the 
present-day conception of the European Union, as marked by the signing of Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, he purports that American support for integration deteriorated (Larres 2009, 151).  
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 As can be seen from the basic history of integration, the successive administrations from 
1945 through 1968 operated under a generally cohesive policy concerning Western Europe. By 
and large, these administrations vehemently supported an integrated Europe, often citing the 
profound political benefits an integrated Europe would bring to the US as justification for 
subordinating America’s economic health to that of Europe. But when Nixon was sworn in, 
American policy towards Europe underwent a reorientation (Lundestad 1998, 100). The break 
with the past administrations can be boiled down to three basic causes.  
 Most prominently, America’s economic power weakened while Europe’s grew stronger. 
The US had succeeded in its goal to put Western Europe’s economy back on its feet. 
Unfortunately for the Americans, much of Europe’s economic strength came at the expense of 
US interests. For example, protective subsidies enabled EEC to keep its domestic agricultural 
prices low, which weakened European demand for American agricultural imports (Berend 2016, 
98).  
From the mid-1950s onward, America’s relative economic strength faltered. Between 
1949 and 1960, the US experienced a nearly 15 percent decrease in its share of output among 
advanced-industrialized countries, a 10 percent decrease in its share of world exports, and saw a 
drastic decline of the dollar on foreign exchange markets (Berend 2016, 98). The United States’ 
balance of payments situation had been deteriorating since 1958 (Van der Beugel 1966, 306), 
becoming a serious threat to America’s economic health by 1965 (Berend 2016, 98). America’s 
reduced economic strength caused a shift in priorities: policy switched from emphasizing the 
achievement of political objectives to ensuring domestic economic health (Lundestad 1998, 97).  
This policy reorientation weakened American support for integration for two reasons. 
First, taking lessons from American history, US policymakers believed that the secret to 
economic prosperity lay in a vast and unimpeded market. According to this logic, an integrated 
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European economy, unobstructed by cumbersome internal trade barriers, would necessarily 
produce a more prosperous Europe. In the face of waning American economic health, 
Washington viewed a more prosperous Europe as a greater threat and thus, American support for 
integration diminished (Lundestad 1998, 14). Second, the US could not be preoccupied with 
issues across the Atlantic when its own economy was in trouble.  
The second cause for the policy change was the precarious status of the United States’ 
general hegemonic position. By the 1960s, Western Europe was strong enough that US-European 
relations came to be characterized by greater balance. No longer did the Pax Americana govern 
the international system. Instead, a growing interdependence developed between the two sides of 
the Atlantic (Berend 2016, 99). Similar to the changing nature of the economic relationship 
between the US and Western Europe, this greater degree of equality of power implied that the 
United States no longer needed to be so intricately involved in another region’s internal affairs. 
Instead, the US could turn inward and focus on the domestic problems boiling up at home. 
 Finally, the political environment was changing. Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, believed that the United States and Western Europe fundamentally diverged on some 
basic interests, particularly economic matters (Lundestad 1998, 102). In the past, US 
administrations had underscored the similarities in European and American interests, making a 
strong partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic appear so desirable. The idea that the US 
and Europe might not be so closely aligned on basic principles shook the bedrock of justification 
for European integration: if Europe and the US were at odds with one another, it was less logical 
to unquestioningly support a strong Europe. Additionally, the American-Soviet rivalry began to 
wane. As will be explored in the following chapter, the Cold War served as a strong initial 
source of American enthusiasm for European integration. The fervor for uniting and federalizing 
Europe abated in America as the Cold War became less menacing (Berend 2016, 95). 
 17 
 Given the reorientation of American policy away from all-out support of European 
integration that began under the Nixon Administration, it makes sense to end this study with 
Nixon’s inauguration/election. From the Truman through the Johnson Administrations, the 
United States operated under a coherent and cohesive policy towards Western Europe: encourage 
the region to integrate. The twenty-three years and five American administrations during which 
US policy was more or less consistent provide an ample time frame to consider how the United 
States influenced European integration. Additionally, this time period saw impressive movement 
towards European integration. One could argue that this initial phase was the most important in 
the integration phenomenon. It kick-started the entire process and saw sovereign states come 
together in ways that were contemporarily unimaginable, given the recent memory of war. 
Conclusion 
Between 1945 and 1968, the United States facilitated and encouraged a closer 
collaboration of Western European states. This particular period of integration is especially 
relevant because it saw great leaps towards European cooperation and also occurred under a 
cohesive American policy. While the literature discusses the phenomenon of European 
integration, it often downplays the American role in the process and fails to posit a theoretical 
manner by which to consider the American-European relationship. This work fills these gaps, 
beginning with considering why the US chose to pursue a policy of encouraging European 
integration for five successive administrations.
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Chapter 2: Motivations for Integration  
Many scholars remark that the United States’ decision to encourage unity rather than 
divisiveness in Western Europe is significant because it marks a distinct break from past tactics 
of dominance (Rappaport 1981, 121). Historically, great powers divided states to conquer and 
subordinate them. The United States, however, had no interest in directly controlling Western 
Europe. Instead, the US sought the region’s reconstruction and return to prosperity. An American 
impetus for European integration existed before World War II even ended, and was widespread 
throughout the US shortly after the War was over (Ellwood 1992, 22).  
Understanding why policymakers in Washington advocated integration is vital to 
comprehending the shape united Europe eventually took: the US had a heavy, although 
sometimes inconspicuous, hand in the European integration process. Crucial to comprehending 
the American role is the recognition that the American approach was not altruistic. The US 
wanted, “to create a united Europe strong enough to defend itself yet no so strong as to threaten 
American economic or political hegemony” (Rappaport 1981, 121). The United States believed it 
could reap economic benefits and greater political clout from an integrated Europe. 
Consequently, the once-isolationist America now enthusiastically immersed itself into regional 
European politics.  
In this chapter, I unravel the underlying American motivations that drove US policy to 
vehemently support integration in Europe. I first explore the contemporary environment to better 
understand the real circumstances that policymakers faced. I then break down domestic 
American ambitions into four different categories of general US policy objectives to serve as a 
loose guide for understanding why officials made certain complex policy prescriptions. These 
four categories are: economic reconstruction of Europe, military security, a supranational design 
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for the integrated continent, and an Atlantic partnership. Finally, I reconcile some internal 
inconsistencies in the American preference for European integration. 
The Contemporary Climate 
Of all the contemporary circumstances that influenced policymakers’ decisions to throw 
their full support behind European integration, the threat of the Cold War was the strongest 
catalyst (Berend 2016, 18). Fear of a potential World War III spread rapidly throughout Western 
Europe and the United States, particularly following the 1948 coup d’état in Prague (Ellwood 
1992, 103). Europeans and Americans alike realized that the world would soon divide itself 
between the communists and the capitalists; where the dividing line would lie remained the only 
question. This uncertainty created great anxiety for the US—even America’s leading allies were 
not assuredly on its side. The French, for example, vengeful of their decline in power, threatened 
communist alliance if the US did not meet their demands for aid (Berend 2016, 44). The US 
needed to take swift and strong action to safeguard its interests abroad.  
Taking lessons from Chamberlain’s failed appeasement policy in 1938, the United States 
recognized that it needed to take a firm resistance against the developing Soviet Bloc to stop the 
Red spread (Berend 2016, 21). In George Kenan’s “long telegram” to Secretary of State George 
Marshall in February of 1946, Kenan outlined the Soviet policies and his beliefs about the best 
course of American action. He noted that unlike Hitler’s Germany, the Soviet Union,  
“is neither schematic nor adventuristic…It does not take unnecessary risks […] For this 
reason it can easily withdraw—and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at 
any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use 
it, he rarely has to do so” (Kennan 1946, 475).  
 
This characterization demonstrates the motivation for establishing a Western bloc against which 
the Soviets would be unmatched, causing them to back down and thus avoiding a World War III. 
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Militarily, the communist hysteria erupting in the United States was a forceful stimulant for the 
US initiative (Berend 2016, 18).  
The threat of World War III, however, did not come from the Soviet Union alone. In the 
immediate post-War years, the German question rang loudly. Geir Lundestad coined the term 
“double containment” to explain the use of integration to provide physical security in the face of 
the Cold War environment: an integrated Europe would contain both the spread of communism 
and simultaneously prevent Germany from again engaging in hostile and threatening activities 
(Lundestad 2003, 38). American policy changed in 1946 from advocating German industrial 
disarmament to prevent a violent resurgence, toward strengthening its industrial capacity. Given 
Germany’s strategically important position in the Cold War as a front between the East and the 
West, the United States was not prepared to lose German support. Consequently, US 
policymakers spearheaded this policy evolution for fear that continuing to dismantle the German 
economy would alienate the West German population and push them into the arms of the Soviet 
Union (Berend 2016, 12). Unity was an impediment to renewed violent and nationalistic 
tendencies; naturally linking Germany with the greater Western European community 
diminished the likelihood that it would attack the region again. Additionally, integration 
provided an alternative to the defeatism that the French sought to impose and solidified a 
cooperative relationship between the two historically antagonistic neighbors (Lundestad 1998, 
24).  
Although a push for integration already existed, American policymakers still worried that 
the peace that immediately prevailed after Hitler’s defeat was only transitory. Given the 
devastation that the Second World War brought to nearly all corners of the earth, officials on 
both sides of the ocean universally agreed upon the imperative of establishing new measures to 
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ensure a sustainable peace. From their view across the Atlantic, many in Washington believed 
that the Westphalian nation-state system upon which Europe was built was obsolete, and that a 
new organizational structure was necessary moving forward (Van der Beugel 1966, 393). 
American officials and many European statesmen alike used basic game theory to conclude that 
integration was the best way to combat a potential resurgence of violent conflict. By linking all 
of the economies and political systems in Western Europe, the losses one would incur from 
inciting violence greatly increased. The greater risk of loss diminished the likelihood of any state 
taking violent action against another to which it was so intricately linked (Lundestad 1998, 24).  
 Physical security was not the only concern in the postwar world. After the end of the 
War, it quickly became evident that Europe’s economy was more devastated than any estimates 
had predicted (Van der Beugel 1966, 38). Early on, the US government recognized that large-
scale and long-term American aid would be required to rebuild the European continent. In 
addition to the obvious benefits that the world economy would accrue from a functioning 
European economy, an additional externality of an American-led economic reconstruction would 
be to limit the Soviet Union’s ability to encroach on the region (Berend 2016, 30). Taking 
lessons from America’s experience during the Great Depression and New Deal era, drafters of 
the Marshall Plan believed that integration was the best way to rebuild the European economy. 
American economic history demonstrated that the path to economic prosperity lie in a large 
economy regulated by the free market with central institutions and unimpeded by internal trade 
barriers (Ellwood 1992, 89).  
 The contemporary circumstances; the fear of another World War and the desperate need 
to revive the world economy, explain why American support for integration caught on so 
strongly and quickly. These circumstances alone, however, do not explain why the United States 
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promoted European integration so emphatically even after the threats of European economic 
collapse, German resurgence, and a Soviet offense dwindled. Deeper understanding of American 
motivations behind integration demand a knowledge of the post-War world that Washington 
envisioned, beginning with an understanding of the economic reconstruction objective. 
Economic Reconstruction 
 After World War II, the United States committed billions of dollars in foreign aid to 
rebuild the struggling European states. The US needed Europe to become financially 
independent so as to relieve American taxpayers from the burden of these massive aid packages 
(Lundestad 1998, 18). US policymakers determined that integration offered the most promising 
solution to enable such an independence, based on logistical hurdles as well as future domestic 
economic objectives. The US expressed this sentiment early on, including their interest in 
European integration in the initial discussions of designing aid programs. A 1947 memorandum 
by George Kennan stated that, “the [recovery] program should be designed to encourage and 
contribute to some form of regional political association of western European states” (Kennan 
1947, 134).  
Two logistical problems made integration attractive. First of all, the European countries 
needed to win over Congress to secure financial assistance. In order to guarantee passage of the 
ERP, Congress needed evidence that the plan would work, and ideally, that it would be 
successful in under four years (Van der Beugel 1966, 166). Originally, the European countries 
drew up aid requests based on national needs, but the United States deemed this form of aid 
application unacceptable. Instead, the US demanded that the states cooperate to draft a 
comprehensive request, based on aggregate regional needs, rather than individual national 
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deficiencies (Ellwood 1992, 90). Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett defined this request 
more explicitly as;  
“Concrete proposals for area-wide recovery of agriculture and basic industries…which 
are fundamental to a viable European economy. Proposals must correlate individual 
national programs and individual industry programs” (Lovett 1947, 229).  
 
Again, taking lessons from America’s previous experiences, US officials believed that the ERP 
would be most successful if it were based on a collaborative effort among the European states.  
The second logistical problem that integration remedied was the actual furnishing of aid. 
Through establishing multilateral economic institutions, integration could also provide a 
mechanism through which aid dollars could be effectively requested, funneled, and distributed. 
American officials agreed that institutionalized economic cooperation between the European 
states was required, and offered the only “politically feasible basis on which the United States 
could operate” (Ellwood 1992, 84). In the same memorandum where he described the 
collaborative effort for aid application, Lovett explained that the establishment of a European 
Customs Union, or another organization that would boost the multilateral nature of the European 
economy, was high on America’s list of priorities (Lovett 1947, 229).  
In addition to the logistical demands, domestic American economic objectives made 
integration attractive. In general, these motivators were more future-oriented than the logistical 
imperatives that first demanded integration. It was this long-run perspective, however, that kept 
the American enthusiasm for integration alive well after Europe’s economy had bounced back.  
First, the US wanted to create a strong trading partner through its reconstruction of the 
European economy. The United States explicitly stated this objective early on and the goal 
empowered a strong support for integration until the US balance of payments situation 
detrimentally deteriorated in the early 1970s (Lundestad 1998, 98). In a 1947 report to President 
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Truman, a council of economic advisers explained the domestic benefits of a strong Europe: “In 
the longer run, the economic restoration of Europe will benefit our economy by enabling us to 
obtain more goods by advantageous trade” (Nourse Report, cited in Van der Beugel 1966, 90). 
Proponents of integration could easily sell utilizing the new Europe to the advancement of the 
American economy to both Congress and the American public, helping integration support stay 
afloat for decades.  
Additionally, the US wanted someone with whom it could share its mounting 
international burdens: forging development in the Third World, containing communism, and 
generally maintaining peace. Although the burden-sharing goal did not gain much momentum 
until after the European economy had been restored, it was a predominant objective under the 
Kennedy Administration (Van der Beugel 1966, 353). Overall, American policymakers strongly 
believed that these economic objectives could be fulfilled through European integration: 
economic integration would enlarge the European market, making it robust enough to take on 
some international responsibilities, serve as a beneficial trading partner, and become independent 
of American financial aid. 
Military Security 
 The second American motivation that fueled its support for integration is military 
security. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 brought this imperative to the forefront, as fear 
of a Soviet military offensive heightened (Van der Beugel 1966, 250). Although within the realm 
of physical security the US was chiefly concerned with preventing communist aggression and 
ensuring that Germany remained a peaceful neighbor and ally, other military considerations also 
generated integration support. 
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In the immediate post-War years, Western Europe had a massive American military 
presence: American forces were the largest Western mobile force deployed on Europe’s lands, 
and in its waters and skies (Holborn 1953, 21). This substantial US military presence created an 
intense need, both politically and economically, to reduce the American military burden in 
Europe (Creswell 2002, 90). Consequently, the United States initially resisted any formal 
security obligation in Europe, and instead encouraged the Western European countries to build a 
European defense alliance, as the Brussels Pact suggested (Ellwood 1992, 123). The Republican 
Congress of the early 1950s was strongly pro-integrationist because it believed that a 
collaborative European military unit would be effective enough to enable a substantial reduction 
in US military expenditures (Lundestad 1998, 46). A greater European role in its own security, 
which would require some degree of European integration and collaboration, could enable a 
reduction in the US military commitment to Europe.  
Nevertheless, as the Soviet threat deepened and the European pleas for American 
assistance grew louder, the United States acquiesced and eventually established NATO. 
Although NATO represented a greater security burden in the US, policymakers in Washington 
expected that the Europeans would meet the American commitment with strong contributions to 
their own defense, particularly in the form of increased conventional troops (Van der Beugel 
1962, 260). President Truman voiced this hope in September of 1950 when he said, “our plans 
[for NATO] are based on the sincere expectation that our efforts will be met with similar action 
on [the Europeans’] part” (Truman 1950, 468). Through NATO, the US sought to reduce the 
number of American troops in Europe by providing the European nations with the assistance to 
augment their own conventional forces.   
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NATO also solidified America’s commitment to Europe. Immediately after the War, 
Western Europe almost entirely relied upon the United States for its physical security 
maintenance. In light of the Cold War climate, the European governments clung to an American 
military presence for protection; many countries even made explicit requests that the United 
States permanently commit itself to an Atlantic security alliance (Lundestad 2003, 48). Many 
Europeans were gravely concerned that the United States’ commitment to their security was not 
credible, and that it might back out on a moment’s notice. This worry was problematic for the 
US: it spawned the possibility that Western European states might turn to the Soviet Union for 
protection if they felt they could not count on the US. To assuage the Europeans’ fears, the 
United States conclusively proved that its pledge was durable by linking the two sides of the 
Atlantic through a binding security alliance (Van der Beugel 1966, 257). NATO simultaneously 
furthered the need for and the realization of European cooperation. The alliance demanded an 
integrated defense system, and so it forced European countries to “realize unified direction and 
effort” (Acheson 1950, 1). Moreover, the US offered military assistance to members of NATO, 
rather than to countries on a bilateral basis (Acheson 1950, 1). Consequently, the design of the 
alliance encouraged closer European cooperation.  
 As with economic integration, another underlying motive in the security realm was to 
link Germany with the rest of the region. Germany’s strategic position in the Cold War 
motivated the US to encourage West German rearmament (Van der Beugel 1966, 262). Given 
Germany’s violent history, this interest was met with a lot of contention, particularly from the 
French. Nevertheless, the United States often expressed that it believed integrating Germany 
politically, economically, and militarily into the rest of Europe would prevent a menacing 
resurgence of German nationalism.  
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Supranational Design 
 The third American motive was to encourage a supranational construction for the new 
Europe to combat the problem of international anarchy. By “supranational”, the US envisioned a 
union where the national governments delegated some power to another authority, made up of 
delegates from all member states. In other words, the US wanted the states of Europe to 
collaborate through international organizations that transcended the sovereignty of national 
governments (Mearsheimer 2003, 30). This objective differs from the economic reconstruction 
or military security imperatives. In the first two categories, American needs and policy 
objectives could be achieved through an integrated Europe in general. The push for a 
supranational design illustrates that the United States was not interested in promoting integration 
in general, but rather a certain type; specifically, one of a supranational design. Despite how 
important this distinct construction was to US goals, American policymakers never explicitly 
stated this objective to the Europeans (Van der Beugel 1966, 402). The lack of concrete 
American policy directing European governments towards this path makes the underlying 
motivations for encouraging a supranational design less clear than those in the economic or 
military realms.  
There are a variety of reasons why the United States would have kept this objective more 
inconspicuous than some of its other goals. For starters, a supranational design would have 
weakened the sovereignty of the individual European countries, thus comparatively elevating the 
American position in the power scale that stretched across the Atlantic. This balance was 
favorable for the US, as the United States was interested in maintaining superiority over the 
European states. Understandably, however it might upset the Europeans and therefore the US 
may have chosen to keep it understated. Additionally, the US officially maintained that although 
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it was more than willing to aid in the establishment of an integrated Europe, the actual design 
and impetus had to come from within Europe. Partly as a result of its firm anti-imperial stance, 
America did not want to appear to be meddling too heavily in another region’s internal affairs 
(Van der Beugel 1966, 42). The US expressed this feeling from the onset of American aid in 
Europe. In a memorandum to Secretary of State Acheson discussing the long-term goal of 
European integration, the policy planning staff noted:  
“It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for [the United States] to undertake to draw up 
unilaterally and to promulgate formally on its own initiative a program designed to place 
western Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The 
formal initiative must come from Europe; the program must be evolved in Europe; and 
the Europeans must bear the basic responsibility for it.” (Kennan 1947, 135). 
 
Yet, through the Nixon Administration, the United States was adamant that European integration 
adopt a supranational form.  
An underlying motive for the supranational design couples with the economic and 
military imperatives: the United States believed that a united Europe organized on a federal basis 
would be the easiest structure with which to cooperate (Lundestad 1998, 16). Instead of having 
to collaborate with multiple governments on European-US objectives, a supranational 
construction of Europe would make negotiations bilateral. Additionally, by virtue of America’s 
federalist history, the analogy between supranationalism and federalism struck a chord with 
many Americans. In this respect, the US supported supranationalism because this construction 
achieved another foreign policy goal: promoting the spread of American values throughout the 
world, including America’s federal version of democracy (Lundestad 1998, 14). 
 Furthermore, the US did not trust the European states’ ability to maintain the peace in 
their current construction. As previously mentioned, the United States believed that the 
Westphalian nation-state design of the past was insufficient to ensure peace in the twentieth 
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century (Van der Beugel 1966, 393). Secretary Dulles went so far as to say that “complete 
sovereignty for the many nations of Europe, […] is a luxury which European countries can no 
longer afford at US expense” (“Memorandum” 1957, 105). The United States concluded that a 
supranational construction of Europe would impede the likelihood of a resurgence of violence: 
increasing the risk associated with inciting violence by inextricably linking national economies 
would remedy the Europeans’ inability to maintain their own security.  
Atlantic Partnership 
 Finally, America’s dream of a strong partnership, stretching across the Atlantic between 
the newly rebuilt Western Europe and the US motivated its pro-integration policy. Naturally, the 
United States wanted the Europe that it rebuilt to closely cooperate with and further American 
policy goals. Even in 1947, policymakers tried to design assistance programs so as to orient the 
aid-receiving nations towards greater cooperation with the US in the long-term (“Report” 1947, 
132). Despite early intimations of an American desire for cooperation between the US and 
Western Europe, the Atlantic Partnership objective in its best-known form was not conceived 
until the Kennedy Administration. In 1962, Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, 
summarized the objectives of the Administration’s Atlantic Partnership goal well in saying,  
“American interests in the present complex are essentially those that we have been 
pursuing over more than a decade: […] to ensure that a United Western Europe works 
with us ever more closely in the framework of an Atlantic alliance for ensuring our 
common security and a close partnership for carrying out our shared responsibilities in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America” (“Scope Paper” 1962, 44).  
 
As the security and economic imperatives of the US-European relationship began to dwindle, the 
effect that a United Europe would have on domestic conditions started to increase in importance 
(Van der Beugel 1966, 325). The United States needed to ensure that the integrated Europe that it 
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had worked so hard to see come to fruition would be one that was complementary to American 
policy objectives.  
In addition to the general concept of a closer collaboration between the two sides of the 
Atlantic, the Kennedy Administration launched the idea of a partnership of two equals. The 
Administration contended that as long as Europe was divided into individual nations, it could 
never be as strong as the United States, thus limiting the potential for real partnership (Van der 
Beugel 1966, 373). Despite Kennedy’s consistent promotion of this argument, historical 
evidence challenges it. Van der Beugel points out that there is no historical example of a 
successful partnership between countries of equal size exists (Van der Beugel 1966, 398). 
Nevertheless, the Kennedy Administration ardently pushed for a more balanced relationship 
stretching across the Atlantic.   
 These four motivations of the pro-integration position outline the basic contemporary 
policy objectives of the United States for five successive presidential administrations. They offer 
a greater understanding of the American decision to break with history and push for unity rather 
than divisiveness. Moreover, these interests help to explain why European integration took the 
shape that it did. Nevertheless, these motives do not completely reveal the entire picture. There 
are some discordant facets of the American encouragement of integration that demand further 
analysis.  
Inconsistencies in the American Integrationist Drive  
As mentioned earlier, the United States did not support all structures of integration. The 
realization that the US did not see “integration” in itself as satisfactory is implicit in the 
understanding that the US pushed for integration based on domestic objectives. Although the 
United States wanted to enable a strong and prosperous Europe, the new construction could 
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threaten neither America’s vision for the post-War world, nor its dominant position in this self-
envisioned landscape (Rappaport 1981, 121). Especially as domestic problems became more 
pressing, emphasis on an advantageous form of integration, rather than integration in general, 
gained momentum. A 1964 pamphlet voiced this concern as, “greater unity in Europe is 
desirable, insofar as it strengthens the Atlantic Community; developments in Europe that weaken 
Atlantic unity are undesirable” (“The Atlantic Alliance” 1964, 18). Yet, even in 1964, this 
sentiment was not widespread: the majority of Americans still supported integration, ignoring 
potential consequences for the US.   
Despite the lack of resistance to integration, the United States would not have tolerated 
an integrated Europe that was not aligned with its post-War vision of the world. For example, de 
Gaulle’s protectionist, France-led Europe vision posed a real threat to American plans. Even if a 
“Gaullist Europe” was united, the United States would have opposed it (Van der Beugel 1966, 
384). Yet, the US never explicitly explained that it was only after a certain kind of integration. 
Even though the US often intimated that the Europe it sought would be friendly and in close 
concert with the US, absent from any official statements was the notion that only some integrated 
structures, namely those designed to operate under US leadership, were acceptable. As will be 
explained, the US used its economic, military, and political strength to encourage this particular 
type of construction.  
 Another important discrepancy in US policy is the indirect exertion of American power 
in Western Europe rather than imposing direct imperialistic rule. This particular command 
structure significantly limited Washington’s ability to affect change in Europe and establish the 
kind of integration it wanted. Moreover, the United States insisted that the integration impetus 
come from within Europe, it could not be imposed by any external force (Van der Beugel 1966, 
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42). The Americans, therefore, faced an intractable coordination problem: they sought the 
establishment of a construction of Europe that they could not directly create. All of the American 
aid that went into Europe’s reconstruction made this problem a difficult pill for many 
policymakers to swallow. A memorandum by Secretary of State Dulles expresses this sentiment 
explicitly;  
“Two world wars have cost us something and we are entitled to have some interest in the 
matter […] the US understands that dictation to European countries would be counter-
productive but as members of the Western Community, we are entitled to some views” 
(“Memorandum” 1956, 172).  
 
Although a push for American assistance within Europe existed (Lundestad 2003, 43), the US 
often struggled with its inability to directly affect change on the continent. The US faced many 
challenges to its power from within Europe. General de Gaulle’s staunch opposition to American 
dominance, for example, made achieving America’s policy objectives from an external position 
more difficult. The American decision to not impose imperial rule in Western Europe is too 
complex to fully examine here, but for moral and economic reasons, imperialistic control was out 
of the question (Lundestad 1998, 155). Consequently, the US had to overcome the coordination 
problem by simultaneously drawing the European states closer together and durably linking the 
United States and Western Europe through integration-seeking mechanisms, like NATO and the 
OECD. 
Finally, one must question why the United States promoted a pro-integration policy when 
the resulting union could have hurt American interests. Strangely enough, the scholarship does 
not give this question much attention. Lundestad (1998) touches slightly on this issue, arguing 
that policymakers generally viewed the domestic economic consequences of European 
integration as subordinate to political objectives. The majority of contemporary American 
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policymakers agreed that the aggregate gains from integration to both the United States economy 
and its political clout would outweigh any negative effects. (Lundestad 1998, 83).  
For example, the drive to create a strong trading partner through integration was based on 
the unfounded assumption that an economically prosperous Europe would inherently be 
advantageous to the United States. Even if American aid dollars facilitated the reconstruction of 
the European economy, there was nothing innate about a prosperous nor integrated Europe that 
would compel it to support US policy objectives. Nevertheless, the American public largely 
assumed that Europe would naturally be on America’s side (Lundestad 1998, 83).  For the 
majority of the time period in question, 1945-1968, the US usually ignored potential negative 
side effects of European integration. 
As the American economic situation began to deteriorate while the European economic 
situation improved, policymakers began questioning using political objectives as an excuse to 
prioritize Europe’s prosperity over America’s (Van der Beugel 1966, 325). Yet, it is still unusual 
that US policymakers would have consistently subordinated their domestic interests to the 
Europeans in the first place. Lundestad (1998) argues that the United States was not acting 
altruistically in supporting Europe’s growth over its own. Rather, the United States accepted 
short-term domestic losses to meet long-term domestic objectives. Even this argument, however, 
rests on the false notion that an integrated Europe would inherently align with American 
objectives. In retrospect, the United States could not incontrovertibly ensure that Europe would 
always side with American policy objectives.  
Nevertheless, one can rationalize this dissonance with the understanding that at the time, 
the United States believed it could prevent any real threat of European opposition through 
leveraging its hegemonic power and dominant financial position (Lundestad 1998, 91). US 
 34 
strength was impressive, particularly since the world was so otherwise void of Western power. 
This relative power made it unforeseeable that any European country, who was so 
contemporarily reliant on US aid, would seriously pose any threat to US objectives. Further, The 
US vowed to only commit itself to countries that would not use American aid to undermine its 
objectives (Kennan 1947, 134).   
  For argument’s sake, allow that the United States believed that it could ensure a Europe 
that would be complementary to its objectives. From this viewpoint then, the American decision 
to support a policy that created domestic losses is not irrational: subordinating domestic needs in 
the short-run would yield long-run payoffs. Still, as evidenced by the many challenges to 
American power in its attempts to encourage integration, it seems imprudent that the US 
believed that a united Europe would emerge that would incontrovertibly advance US objectives. 
Nevertheless, little evidence suggests that the United States recognized this uncertainty that 
undergirded its entire European foreign policy for the first post-War decades. Therefore, one can 
assume that the United States indeed believed its hegemonic position guaranteed that a united 
Europe would undoubtedly support American interests in the long-term. 
Conclusion 
Gaining a deeper understanding of the shape that European integration ultimately took 
requires a knowledge of why the United States pursued a pro-integration policy for the better 
part of the post-War years. The United States’ motivation can essentially be broken down into 
four separate categories of sub-objectives: economic reconstruction, physical security, 
supranational design, and an Atlantic partnership. Despite some paradoxical facets of American 
policy, these four motives explain why the US sought European integration in general, as well as 
help illuminate the rationale behind the specific type of integration it supported.
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Chapter 3: The Principal-Agent Model and Strategic Choice 
 In order to understand the intricacies of the international system that the aims laid out in 
the previous chapter motivated, one must consider this international structure’s origins. This 
process demands a theoretical study of the relationships within the relevant international system. 
Put another way, understanding the shape of European integration and the American role in this 
process fundamentally requires an understanding of the relationship between the United States 
and its Western European allies.  
In analyzing the phenomenon of European integration, scholars have tried to apply 
traditional international relations theories. The liberalist and realist camps, however, have limited 
their works to only considering integration from one side; generally, that of the Europeans. 
While these analyses of integration (Rosato 2010, Moravcsik 2005) reconcile the events within 
traditional international theory rather well, they leave out a crucial piece of the puzzle: the role of 
the United States. As the United States held the dominant position in the Western world’s power 
structure, American policymakers had a heavy hand in shaping the process of European 
integration. This influence was generally indirect, and often camouflaged under the guise of 
something other than America intervening directly in Western European politics. For example, 
US policymakers packaged integration as essential to the logistical distribution of ERP funds. 
This often-covert nature of American influence explains why many scholars have ignored or 
downplayed the American role in European integration when applying traditional theory to 
analyze the process. Yet, the intensity of American influence in Western Europe in the years 
after World War II implies that analyses of European integration must consider the relationship 
between the two sides of the Atlantic to ensure full comprehension of the phenomenon.  
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Since the United States did not employ a traditional hegemonic strategy, such as 
imperialistic rule, non-traditional theories are required. The Principal-Agent (PA) Model offers a 
unique perspective of the US-Western Europe dynamic. The model presents a way to understand 
how the United States exerted its power over its Western European allies. The following chapter 
explores the Principal-Agent Model. It first outlines the relevant assumptions and the appropriate 
environmental setup for the context of analyzing international relations. I then explore the 
application of the model to the Western European-United States case.  
Principal-Agent Model: The Setup  
 Economists originally developed the Principal-Agent Model to explain how one agent 
can leverage incentives to achieve a desirable outcome over which he has no direct control 
(Miller 2005, 204). To be a principal, the actor must be able to both grant and revoke authority 
(Hawkins et. al. 2006, 7). The principal has some goal that he cannot fulfill independently, but 
for which he specifically selects the agent to achieve. In other words, the principal is dependent 
on the agent. In this model, the principal is unable to contract with the agent in a conventional 
nature to secure its objectives. Instead, the principal offers the agent some sort of incentive 
scheme to encourage the agent to act in a manner that will further the principal’s goals.  
In the context of international relations, this relationship implies a power disparity 
between the principal and the agent. For one reason or another, the principal objectively has a 
greater degree of power in the world system than does the agent. If we undertake the realist 
assumption that all nations are in competition with one another to accumulate greater national 
power (Mearsheimer 2003, 29), then this power imbalance between the principal and the agent 
naturally creates an incentive scheme. The principal can encourage the agent to act in a manner 
advantageous to its own goals by offering to confer a degree of authority to the agent, thus 
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boosting the agent’s position in the world power structure. Since greater power is always ideal 
under the realist school of thought, this is a powerful incentive (Mearsheimer 2003, 29). In 
essence, the incentive scheme developed in the PA model can be viewed as a form of delegation: 
the principal conditionally grants authority to the agent so as to empower the agent to act on its 
behalf (Hawkins et. al.  2006, 7).   
Ultimately, since each actor is autonomous and the relationship between the principal and 
the agent is neither explicitly defined nor contractually binding, the agent can act in whatever 
manner it chooses. For the sake of simplicity, this aspect will be modeled as the agent choosing 
between one of two options: compliance or non-compliance. The principal’s lack of control over 
the agent’s actions demands that the principal create some set of monitoring institutions or 
mechanisms of control to ensure favorable actions on the agent’s part (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 8).  
Past applications of the PA model in the political science and international relations 
realms have largely dealt with either domestic politics or delegation to international 
organizations; scant attention has been given to its interstate relations applications. This void 
creates some need to deviate from the theory’s traditional assumptions and claims. For example, 
in applications outside of the economics discipline, there typically can be more than one 
principal, but only one agent. In considering interstate relations with the presence of a hegemon1, 
this set-up will be reversed, with one principal and multiple agents. Switching these roles means 
that this situation diverges from traditional applications’ findings and patterns regarding the 
choice to delegate, monitoring strategies, and how the principal influences the agent.  
                                                
 
1 A hegemon refers to a state with economic, military, and/or political preponderance in the 
world power system 
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Principal-Agent Model: Application 
 To delve into the application of the PA model to the post-World War II Transatlantic 
relationship, we must reconcile the features of this relationship with the model’s basic set-up. 
Adhering to conventional conceptions of the PA model, the US-Western Europe relationship 
features a power disparity between the principal and the agent: the United States was the only 
Western power not completely ravaged by World War II, and as such, it served as virtually the 
only source of credit to the majority of war-torn and insolvent Western Europe (Lundestad 2003, 
46). The heavy European dependence on American aid gave the United States an important 
advantage over the European people. US policymakers tried to use this position to encourage the 
European states to act according to American goals (Van der Beugel 1966, 103). Thus, in this 
application, the United States acts as the principal while the Western European states function as 
agents.  
There are six core assumptions of the Principal-Agent Model in its traditional form: (1) 
the principal’s payoff is dependent on the agent’s action; (2) the principal can only observe 
outcomes, but not the agents’ actions themselves; (3) the two sets of actors have fundamentally 
different preferences; (4) the principal initiates any action based on coherent preferences; (5) the 
principal can generally guess how the agent will respond to certain actions; and (6) the principal 
has ultimatum bargaining power over the agent (Miller 2005, 206). While these assumptions are 
based on an application in economics, they generally extend, with some variance, to the realms 
of political science and international relations.  
The US-European situation meets all of these canonical assumptions. (1) The United 
States was dependent upon the Europeans to see the fruition of its goal: an integrated Europe. (2) 
Washington could observe the outcomes of European decisions, but for many events, the US was 
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barred from observing the decision-making process and therefore could not assuredly know the 
preferences of every European state. (3) Although many European states agreed with the 
objective of integration, ultimately, they wanted to retain their sovereignty and thus divergent 
preferences existed across the two sides of the Atlantic. (4) The United States generally initiated 
the action, calling for an integrated Europe and providing the funds to achieve it. (5) American 
policymakers could generally infer how the Europeans would react to any particular policy 
prescription or statement, and consequently tailored their actions to achieve certain results. 
Finally, (6) the United States had ultimatum bargaining power: it could have revoked all aid to 
the European governments had it felt that doing so was the best course of action. 
 In addition to these canonical assumptions, analysis of the transatlantic relationship in the 
post-War world relies on some other important assumptions. Chiefly, this particular application 
operates under the assumption of strategic choice. The strategic-choice approach generates a 
mechanism to analyze how actors go about making decisions. This approach assumes that all 
actors are rational and purposive, meaning that they respond to any given action based on a 
coherent set of preferences in order to meet defined goals. More specifically, a strategic 
interaction implies that, “each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how other actors 
behave, and therefore each actor must take the actions of others into account” (Lake & Powell 
1999, 3).  
Under the strategic-choice approach, there are four independent variables to consider: 
possible actions, available information, actors’ preferences, and their beliefs about the 
preferences of others (Lake & Powell 1999, 8). As a result of the multiple agent-set-up of the 
US-Western Europe relationship, there is another dimension of the strategic interaction variables. 
Although individual states have coherent preferences, one can assume some heterogeneity across 
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states. The presence of multiple agents implies that when developing their strategies, agents had 
to consider their own beliefs about the preferences of the principal, but also those beliefs of the 
other agents, and what strategies these beliefs would lead their peers to adopt. In this particular 
context, this implication means that other European states’ actions were of the utmost importance 
in an individual state’s decision-making process. By disaggregating all outcomes into these 
variables, one can draw robust conclusions about how outcomes came to be and thus formulate 
theories about how actors make complex decisions. 
 Another importance facet of the PA model is its dependence on asymmetries in 
information between the principal and the agent. In the context of international relations, 
“information” refers to preferences, defined as the ranking of various potential outcomes 
(Frieden 1999, 41). The strategic-choice approach assumes preferences are exogenous and 
constant throughout the duration of any particular round of strategic interaction (Frieden 1999, 
46). Further, actors adopt strategies as paths to achieving their defined preferences. In this 
context, the preferences of the other relevant actors, those of each European state and the United 
States, in a particular strategic interaction are unobservable; each actor can only infer the aims of 
the other actors. This inference cannot be drawn directly from observed behaviors because doing 
so would ignore the strategic setting in which actors design their strategies. If one were to infer 
an actor’s preferences based only on the strategies it employed, it is likely that certain 
concessions, compromises, and strategic moves would be overlooked, thus leading to a false 
assumption of preferences (Frieden 1999, 48). This asymmetry of information regarding the 
other actors’ objectives creates the foundation of the contractual relationship in the PA model: 
The United States’ information disadvantage compels American policymakers to offer incentives 
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to the European countries in order to induce these agents to choose strategies that will produce 
America’s most preferred outcomes.  
Additionally, since we are examining interstate relations, another assumption of this 
particular application will be of an international system of anarchy. Essentially, this means that 
the state is the most powerful sovereign entity and no effective organizing force with greater 
authority than national governments exists. This assumption implies that neither a hegemon nor 
an international organization has the power to authoritatively control another sovereign state 
(Mearsheimer 2003, 30). More specifically, the United States, nor any supranational 
organization, could compel the European states to act in a certain way. This construction 
explains actors’ decisions to contract with one another in a principal-agent relationship, as 
opposed to in a more direct or credible manner. Because all of the relevant actors are sovereign 
states, under a system of international anarchy, there is no way to credibly contract between 
actors since no greater power through which states can truly be held accountable exists. While 
international organizations have been developed to try and mitigate this coordination problem, 
ultimately, under anarchy, the dilemma persists. As such, states have to encourage one another to 
choose strategies that will lead to the fulfillment of their own preferences. In this application of 
the PA model, this encouragement takes the form of the United States offering incentives to the 
European countries, in order to induce them to take the specific actions that will lead to 
America’s most-preferred outcome.  
There are two other questions at hand which must be addressed. Firstly, why states would 
concede to delegate some degree of their authority when realist theory claims that accumulating 
national power is the chief goal of sovereign nations. To answer this question completely, one 
must consider the alternatives to delegation: unilateralism or international cooperation (Hawkins 
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et. al. 2006, 11). Unilateralism was not a productive option for the US because it demands that 
the United States undertake the expensive task of imperialistic control so that it could force its 
policies upon the region. On the other hand, international cooperation relies on policy 
implementation through national laws or regulations, with no international third-party to serve as 
an enforcement force (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 11). Given the contemporary state of affairs in 
Europe when the US first undertook the task of encouraging integration, one characterized by 
distrust and physical and economic ruin, international cooperation was unviable.  
Delegation, however, allows nations to reap benefits from basic economic theory: 
division of labor and gains from specialization (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 13). The theory essentially 
states that different nations have productivity advantages, and by specializing in the good that 
one nation is comparatively more efficient at producing, there are gains to be had from trade 
(Ricardo 1817). In the context of the US-European relationship, the European states had the 
comparative advantage in European policy. Given this comparative advantage, it would have 
been too costly and inefficient for the Americans to dictate policy or directly control the 
European states. By delegating the task of carrying out integration to the European countries 
rather than imposing it upon them, the United States operated according to basic economic 
theory.  
On a similar note, states, like firms, only have finite resources. In order to function 
successfully, states must allocate these resources in the most efficient way to achieve their 
objectives. By encouraging the European nations to integrate themselves rather than undertaking 
the expensive and imperialistic task of forcing it upon the region, the United States used its 
resources most efficiently.  
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Secondly, the fundamental question of the PA model asks how the principal ensures that 
the agent acts advantageously on its behalf. To this end, the principal employs mechanisms of 
control designed to make the agents’ best interest and the principal’s preferences analogous. The 
specific mechanisms of control that the principal chooses to use are heavily situation-dependent. 
Broadly speaking, these instruments should (1) make it so that the agent wants to act in ways that 
the principal deems advantageous, and (2) enables the principal to monitor the agent’s actions 
such that the principal can punish the agent if he is shirking (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 24).   
The principal selects a control strategy based on many different factors. First, the strategy 
must convince the agent that the principal’s threats and power are credible. Second, as will be 
further discussed, the principal and agent are not fully informed about each other’s intentions. 
The principal must seriously try to anticipate how the agent will react to its demands. Since 
objectives are not directly observable, the principal’s selection of a strategy is ultimately based 
on an uncertainty about how the agent will react; whether he will choose compliance or non-
compliance. This uncertainty can take different forms. It could manifest as fear; that the agent 
ultimately wants the principal to fail, indeterminacy; that the agent will need significant 
reinforcement to act according to the principal’s objectives, or ignorance; that the agent does not 
know whether or how to comply with the principal’s demands (Marcum 2015, 89). Additionally, 
since asserting power is a costly business and states have limited resources, the cost of any given 
strategy must be taken under serious consideration.  
As previously mentioned, the reversal of the typical political science set-up, featuring one 
agent and multiple principals, has some important implications. Most prominently, the 
mechanisms for monitoring and controlling the agents are different. The number of agents over 
which the United States had to exert control rendered direct strategies inefficient. Instead of just 
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having to observe the actions of one unitary actor, the US had to follow the actions of all of the 
Western European states involved. While it was too costly to employ direct strategies, it was also 
implausible to be too hands-off. Since the US was working with so many different, non-unitary 
agents, allowing a great degree of autonomy and authority heightened the risk of non-compliance 
by some if not all of the agents. Thus, the United States had to operate somewhere in the middle; 
dictating its goals to the agents and pushing for compliance through incentive schemes. To 
achieve this balance and induce compliance, the US employed three broad mechanisms of 
control: financial aid, military security, and leverage of its dominant political position. The 
following chapter elaborates on the application of these mechanisms.  
Conclusion 
 Applying the PA model to the relationship between Western Europe and the United 
States in the decades immediately following World War II offers new insight into the degree of 
influence the United States possessed in European integration. The US used its position as a 
hegemon as leverage to induce the European states to integrate. Sometimes, the US succeeded in 
incentivizing Europe to do what it wanted, and other times it did not. Whether Washington was 
able to engender specific instances of integration is a result of how well American policymakers 
inferred the preferences and beliefs of the European states. The European governments made all 
decisions within the strategic environment and thus policymakers had many important variables 
to consider: personal preferences, the preferences of the other agents, their own as well as the 
other agents’ beliefs about what the United States preferred, the range of possible actions, and all 
the information that they had available. Examining integration in the context of the strategic 
environment with attention to the principal-agent nature of the US-European relationship 
presents a new perspective of why European integration.
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Chapter 4: The United States, Western Europe, and Integration 
 Thus far, I have established the United States’ pro-integration motivations: those factors 
that catalyzed the American decision to encourage integration for five successive presidential 
administrations, from 1945 to 1968. I have also laid out a framework through which one can 
consider the US-Western European relationship during this period. Based on this groundwork, I 
can explore how, specifically, the United States went about encouraging integration. And 
particularly, how the US promoted a construction that would be domestically advantageous, 
while deterring the formation of any sort of integrated Europe that might be contrary to 
American domestic objectives.  
 The following chapter uses the Principal-Agent Model framework to examine two 
different American policy programs, the Marshall Plan and the European Defense Community. 
By applying the PA framework, it is possible to demonstrate how the United States employed 
mechanisms of control to encourage the European states to integrate as well as to fulfil 
America’s underlying motivations. I first outline the basic methodology for analyzing whether 
the US achieved its objectives. This chapter then diverges into the two different programs. In 
accordance with the PA model framework, I examine the most relevant strategic interaction 
variable for each of these programs to make claims about why the United States chose certain 
policy prescriptions and why the European states reacted as they did. I subsequently analyze the 
United States’ relative success or failure in each program at achieving each dimension of the 
integration objective. Finally, this chapter offers remarks on each program’s legacy. 
Methodology 
 Process tracing is the act of disaggregating events into individual actions and tracing the 
link between potential causes and observed results to make causal inferences about the outcome 
 
 
46 
(Beach & Pedersen 2013, 2). Using this method to examine the American implementation of the 
Marshall Plan and the US support of the European Defense Community enables me to 
demonstrate how the United States influenced the European integration process. In order to use 
this method, I break down each program and consider specific instances of American influence 
and strategy. Analyzing both the Marshall Plan and American support of the EDC in the context 
of the strategic environments in which the programs were developed offers important insight into 
the shape that they took. As previously mentioned, the four variables of any strategic interaction 
are: the objective, the other actors’ beliefs about the principal’s preferences, the information 
available, and the range of possible actions (Lake & Powell 1999, 8). It is beyond the scope of 
this work to analyze each component of the strategic environment of these two programs. 
Instead, I examine just one variable in each program. Because every variable so intimately 
affects the others, this concession does not hinder my ability to demonstrate why the US 
advocated certain policy prescriptions and the implications of these choices. 
I selected these two cases for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the promotion of both 
programs furthered US attempts to achieve all four underlying motivations. The Marshall Plan 
primarily focused on economic reconstruction, but it also linked the two sides of the Atlantic 
through logistic operational bodies like the OEEC, thereby advancing the transatlantic 
partnership motivation as well. As the EDC was a plan for a supranational European army, 
ratification would have furthered both the military security and supranational design goals. 
Moreover, the Marshall Plan and American support of the EDC represent the two most 
prominent American policy programs during the period in question. 
Additionally, the two cases have important similarities. Notably, both programs feature 
the same actors and their roles in the PA model remain constant across the two programs: the 
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United States had the ability to leverage its political and economic dominance and served as the 
principal, while the weaker European states were the agents. Both programs also feature 
information asymmetries; primarily, each actor’s uncertainty about the preferences of its peers. 
These informational asymmetries prove fundamental to the decisions that actors made. Yet, 
despite these similarities, the Marshall Plan succeeded while the EDC Treaty was never fully 
ratified. Since the United States used different methods of control in each of the programs, 
strategy variation is the independent variable. In large part, examining the difference in control 
mechanisms explains the variation in outcomes. 
As discussed in the first chapter, in the context of this work, integration is considered to 
be a process, rather than an end in itself. Therefore, to analyze whether these programs 
succeeded in furthering American objectives, the question is not if the agents were compliant, but 
rather how compliant were the agents? This question is highly qualitative and does not provide 
easily discernable or objective standards of success. As such, I will examine each policy program 
from a broad point of view, comparing the stated US objective to the overall results. The explicit 
American objective was: to promote and see the establishment of an integrated and cooperative 
Europe, strong enough to be independent of American aid and serve as a valuable domestic asset, 
but not so strong as to threaten American superiority (Rappaport 1981, 121). Since this goal is 
multi-faceted, it is useful to break the policy down into its four different dimensions: (1) closer 
cooperation among the Europeans, (2) transatlantic orientation, (3) European reconstruction, and 
(4) American preeminence. These four components speak to the type of integration that the US 
sought. By breaking the American objective down into these smaller goals, I can more easily 
assess the success or failure of the American programs.   
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The Marshall Plan 
 The Marshall Plan primarily sought to rebuild the Western European economies. Given 
the magnitude of the financial aid allocated and the need to ensure responsibility of its use, the 
US demanded the development of regional organizations dedicated to oversight and distribution. 
These logistic operational bodies encouraged closer cooperation among both the Western 
European recipients as well as between the recipients and patron, thereby working to strengthen 
the Atlantic partnership. The Plan additionally enabled the development of other crucial 
associations that propelled the integration process forward, such as the OEEC and the ECSC 
(Morella 2008, 6). The wide breadth of the Marshall Plan’s influence, as well as its role in 
intricately involving the United States in Western European affairs, makes analyzing this 
program necessary to understand the American role and the shape of European integration.  
Strategy  
The US made clear that it wanted an economic reconstruction of Western Europe, as well 
as a closer collaboration of European states, with the ultimate goal of an institutionalized 
integration (Ellwood 1992, 83). More specifically, the US sought the development of a 
multilateral clearing system, reduced trade barriers, and the eventual establishment of a customs 
union (Lovett 1947, 229). While the US made its objectives explicit, the European states’ 
preferences were more ambiguous. Western Europe knew it could not survive without American 
financial assistance (Lundestad 2003, 46). The Europeans understood that that some degree of 
compliance was necessary because the Marshall Plan required congressional approval before 
Europe would receive any aid money. The extent to which they needed to comply to receive aid, 
however, was unclear (Ellwood 1992, 89). The British frequently toed the line, pushing the 
United States to see how far they could go in refusing compliance before defiance became a real 
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threat to Anglo-American relations and to the offer of aid. They resisted American pressure to 
take the internal leadership role in the integration process and repeatedly fought other US 
attempts at achieving closer European economic and political collaboration (Dobson 1995, 96).  
Since the European states resisted compliance whenever possible, a cloud of uncertainty 
surrounded how the agents would react to any given US directive (Van der Beugel 1966, 55). 
Thus, the strategic interaction variable of relevance in the implementation of the Marshall Plan is 
the American beliefs about the European states’ preferences and available actions. Given this 
informational dynamic, the United States implemented a unique strategy of control. It endowed 
its agents with some degree of authority with which to carry out US objectives, but limited their 
autonomy in doing so. In other words, the US gave its agents substantial latitude to make 
decisions that would affect the shape of integration, but the European states had little choice 
about whether or how to comply with the specific demands that the US set forth (Marcum 2015, 
92). To achieve this particular type of control, the United States operated under a general theme 
of respect for its agents’ sovereignties, while still leveraging America’s economic and political 
superiority.  
This governing ideology was not always clear-cut. US officials struggled with competing 
goals: to realize their objectives without impinging upon the European states’ authorities. 
Europe, and Great Britain in particular, was not accustomed having domestic policy dictated. As 
such, states were often reluctant to act according to US directives (Dobson 1995, 90). The 
Congressional debate on the ERP exemplifies this internal struggle; how to balance encouraging 
integration without offending Europe to the point of non-compliance. Led by Representative 
William Fulbright, a large congressional contingent ardently believed that the Europeans should 
only be eligible to receive American aid if they took observable steps toward integration (Van 
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der Beugel 1966, 103). ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman even suggested suspending Marshall 
aid to Great Britain if the British continued to refuse involvement in the integration process 
(Dobson 1995, 96).  
Although the contingency arguments sparked debate, at Secretary of State Marshall’s 
urging, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ultimately concluded that making aid reliant 
upon discernible movement towards greater European cooperation was not likely to produce the 
desired results (Marshall 1947, 1213). In delegating authority to the European states, American 
policymakers believed that it was of the utmost importance to recognize and not offend European 
sovereignty. The US therefore tried to be sensitive to the fact that the Western European 
countries were highly developed, sovereign entities who would resent external interference in 
their internal affairs (Van der Beugel 1966, 113). This feeling manifested itself in the American 
effort to encourage the impetus for integration to be European-born and to avoid making 
imperial-like demands. The Truman Administration and its successors made it clear that the US 
was not in a position to demand specific actions from the Europeans (Marshall 1947, 1213).  
In its efforts to respect European sovereignties, the US generally tried to be 
accommodating and otherwise non-combative. For example, despite the priority of the American 
objective to integrate Germany into the rest of Western Europe, the United States initially tried to 
remain rather soft-spoken about this goal. Policymakers made this effort to avoid antagonizing 
the French, whose support America desperately needed (Van der Beugel 1966, 74). Furthermore, 
the strong interest in British involvement motivated ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman to omit 
any mention of supranational institutions in his proposal of the EPU, given Britain’s staunch 
opposition to anything supranational (Eichengreen 2007, 80). In addition to trying to avoid 
policies that would be antagonistic, when it was necessary to make explicit demands, the US 
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tried not to appear too demanding. At an official meeting between the executive members of the 
Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) and American officials, William 
Clayton laid out seven points that the US wished to see in the conference’s final report (Van der 
Beugel 1966, 80). Clayton framed these points as “friendly advice,” rather than demands. 
Framing the suggestions in this way emboldened the European states to make “a great effort […] 
to meet the United States point of view in spite of the great difficulties, raised by some of the 
participating nations” (Van der Beugel 1966, 81). Thus, the American strategy’s accommodating 
nature encouraged compliance.  
 The US faced the most trouble in securing its preferences in confrontations with the 
British. Britain was less interested in the integration project than its continental neighbors, 
instead prioritizing the Commonwealth and its “special relationship” with the United States 
(Lundestad 1998, 30). The face-offs with the British demonstrate another facet of the American 
strategy: although the US generally tried to remain respectful of European sovereignties, it did 
not hesitate to leverage its political and economic superiority when necessary.  
A chief example of the Anglo-American cross-ocean tug of war can be found in the 
debate over British involvement in the EPU, a multilateral payments system among OEEC 
members designed to ease trade in the face of inconvertible currencies. The ECA proposed that 
drawing rights should be transferable among OEEC members and convertible into American 
dollars, to ease the burden on the American economy and the flow of European trade. In effect, 
the convertibility of drawing rights would enable European countries to continue to import 
American goods, essentially on credit, despite temporary balance of payments deficits with the 
US. The British government fiercely resisted joining the Union, primarily for concern about 
preserving the sterling area (Adams 2018). But, America’s position as the largest international 
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creditor gave the US some latitude to dictate policy when necessary. The United States funded 
the EPU with ERP funds (Ellwood 1992, 160). In doing so, Congress implied that those left out 
of the Union were also left out from aid allocations. Moreover, Congress stipulated that all of the 
money it provided for the purpose of promoting this multilateral trading and transferability 
system had to be used to this effect; any money not used for this purpose would be returned to 
the Treasury. Congress intended this provision to exert pressure on the UK to join the payments 
union (Board of Governors 1950, I4). Once it became clear that continuing to resist membership 
would be detrimental in terms of harming American good will, Britain capitulated (Eichengreen 
2007, 80). After multiple rounds of negotiations, the US reconciled the British into the Union as 
a full member (Ellwood 1992, 160).   
Moreover, the US used the necessity of congressional approval in allocating ERP funds 
to secure European compliance. The US often intimated that both Congress and the American 
taxpayers would be impressed by positive steps taken towards integration. In a 1949 speech, 
ECA director Paul Hoffman expressed the widespread American interest in integration, using 
American support as bait.   
“The People and the Congress of the United States and, I am sure, a great majority of the 
people of Europe have instinctively felt that economic integration is essential if there is to 
be an end to Europe’s recurring economic crises. A European program to this end – one 
which should show real promise of taking this great forward step successfully – would, I 
strongly believe, give new impetus to the American support for carrying through into 
1952 our joint effort toward lasting European recovery” (Hoffman 1949). 
 
Framing the situation in this way still had the effect of encouraging the Europeans to act 
favorably, but it came off as less hostile than had the legislation explicitly required progress. 
Leveraging the incentive of financial aid became an important American technique. Indeed, this 
tactic pushed the French government to see the necessity of economic integration, as well as to 
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prepare itself to engage in negotiations to see its realization (Berend 2016, 48). Without French 
approval of and accession to the integration scheme, progress would have been unlikely.    
Objective #1: Closer Cooperation 
The Marshall Plan was instrumental in facilitating a closer cooperation among the 
European states. One primary tactic to elicit this closer collaboration was to use the logistical 
distribution challenges accompanying Europe’s financial reliance on America to promote closer 
collaboration. For example, the US mandated the creation of collaborative bodies of regional 
authority to oversee aid distribution. The US required that the OEEC be responsible for 
coordinating and integrating the national programs of its Member States. This mandate 
empowered the OEEC to both aggregate national programs as well as serve as a third-party 
cross-examiner to ensure productivity and effectiveness (Van der Beugel 1966, 147). Further, the 
ECA, the US agency in charge of the ERP, collaborated only with the OEEC, rather than with 
individual governments bilaterally (Van der Beugel 1966, 142). Additionally, although the 
Europeans originally submitted their aid requests based only on national considerations, the US 
demanded they instead compile a comprehensive list of needs for all of Western Europe (Lovett 
1947, 229). This demand compelled national governments to consider one another’s needs and 
work together to present an inclusive proposal. 
Moreover, the OEEC itself was a source of closer collaboration among the European 
states. The Organization was comprised of Member State delegates. By facilitating Europeans 
coming together to negotiate as a single unit with the United States concerning aid matters, the 
OEEC furthered collaboration (Van der Beugel 1966, 165). Additionally, since the Organization 
aggregated and cross-examined national programs, it meant that European national economic 
programs began to take the other states’ plans into greater consideration (Van der Beugel 1966, 
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147). Furthermore, the prior existence of the OEEC and EPU enabled the establishment of the 
ECSC, which created a single European market (Van der Beugel 1966, 233). Thus, by extension, 
the Marshall Plan also worked to empower future European cooperation.  
Objective #2: Transatlantic Orientation 
The most important motivation behind ensuring Western Europe’s transatlantic 
orientation was the American desire to secure an advantageous trading partner. The US allocated 
350 million dollars-worth of Marshall Plan aid to capitalize the EPU and in doing so, 
Washington demanded the liberalization of intra-European trade and payments, effectively 
creating a customs union and paving the road towards a single market (Eichengreen 2007, 79). 
Simply put, the US sought to establish a large and unobstructed European market. The United 
States believed that access to this type of European market would facilitate greater trade across 
the two sides of the Atlantic; increasing the degree of interdependence and domestic benefits for 
the US.   
The implementation of the Marshall Plan also inextricably linked the two sides of the 
Atlantic in the sense that it demanded that Europe make policy decisions with an eye on the US. 
Since aid allocations were at the will of congressional approval, Europe needed to be in 
Congress’ good graces. As such, officials closely considered how Washington might receive any 
changes in national policies (Van der Beugel 1966, 147). Furthermore, the US sought to establish 
a new economic structure in Europe that was reminiscent of the American economy (Ellwood 
1992, 90). In pursuing this goal, policymakers necessarily advocated a Europe oriented towards 
the US. 
Although the US only committed itself to supplying Europe with aid through the ERP for 
four years, in establishing the logistical bodies to distribute and monitor aid, the US effectively 
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tied itself to Europe for much longer. The OEEC, created by the Marshall Plan, evolved into 
what is today the OECD. As such, the Marshall Plan provided the foundation for lasting 
interdependence and collaboration between the European states and across the Atlantic.  
Objective #3: European Reconstruction 
 The Marshall Plan’s primary purpose was to facilitate Western Europe’s economic 
reconstruction through the distribution of American assistance. In this respect, the Plan was 
wildly successful. By the time the program ended in 1952, the US had supplied over 100 billion 
2008 USD to 16 European countries (Morella 2008, 5). This aid money saved Western Europe 
from starvation, jumpstarted industrial growth, and revitalized agricultural production (Bossuat 
2008, 17). Western Europe’s post-World War II economic recovery far surpassed its previous 
degree of economic prosperity (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 28). While economic growth was 
rampant across the world during the post-War period, the countries that received ERP funds 
underwent productivity surges far greater than those states that did not (DeLong & Eichengreen 
1991, 29). Further, even among all ERP recipients, those in which the US had the greatest 
influence experienced the fastest rate of reconstruction: the US had the most influence in 
Germany and the least in Britain; German economic recovery was the most successful whereas 
British was the least (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 54). 
 In addition to kick-starting economic reconstruction by providing emergency funds and 
restoring financial stability, the Marshall Plan also catalyzed long-term sustained and dynamic 
economic growth. ERP funds went towards furthering public and private investments, relaxing 
constraints on foreign exchanges, restoring the free market’s ability to regulate itself, and 
curbing inflationary tendencies (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991). While it is impossible to 
speculate the state of the Western European economies if not for the Marshall Plan, the relative 
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success of ERP recipients’ economies compared to other expanding economies, demonstrates the 
Plan’s importance.      
Objective #4: American Preeminence  
The question of how the implementation of the Marshall Plan inspired an integration that 
would generate domestic advantages for the United States remains. The wording of the Marshall 
Plan explicitly fostered domestic benefits. For example, Congress stipulated that recipients spend 
seventy percent of ERP aid on American-made goods. Further, Congress demanded that all 
governments receiving aid suppress communist movements within their countries, by removing 
any members of the Communist Party from governing coalitions (Hunt 2007, 167).  Moreover, in 
enabling the birth of the EPU, the Marshall Plan also bolstered the American economy. The EPU 
enabled the European states to effectively purchase goods on credit. Since the European 
economies heavily depended on American goods, the EPU maintained and augmented the influx 
of American goods to the European market (Adams 2018). 
In addition to creating domestic advantages, the Marshall Plan cemented the American 
leadership role in the transatlantic relationship. The need to remain in Washington’s good graces 
kept the Europeans compliant and acting in accordance with American preferences, as evidenced 
by Britain’s eventual concession to membership in the EPU (Eichengreen 2007, 80). The 
Marshall Plan went even further in securing American preeminence by enforcing the 
international dominance of the dollar. The EPU, capitalized by the Marshall Plan, set the 
European currencies based on the gold value of the dollar (Eichengreen 2007, 77). In doing so, 
national governments in Europe gave up their capacity to insulate their economies from 
America’s macroeconomic policies. For example, the US to controlled inflation policies in 
Europe (Adams 2018). As such, American policies heavily influenced the European economies.  
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Finally, the Marshall Plan facilitated American preeminence by elevating and spreading 
American culture in Western Europe. The United States sought to furnish the Europe that it 
helped to build with American values and culture (Lundestad 1998, 14). Through the Marshall 
Plan, Europeans came in closer contact with the US and American culture. A new kind of middle 
class, oriented towards the US, emerged (Bossuat 2008, 21). Europeans were exposed to and thus 
more interested in American politics and popular culture (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 9). European 
markets began trying to emulate those in America, particularly inspired by both American mass 
media and marketing techniques. The OEEC, created by the Marshall Plan, also worked to 
spread American production methods by sending Europeans to the US to learn from American 
productivity standards (Bossuat 2008, 21). The Marshall Plan, and the organizations it spawned, 
worked to secure US leadership in political, economic, and social realms.  
European Defense Community  
 The Cold War climate and fear of another violent conflict on the European continent 
created a desire to develop a system of regional collective security. The first attempt at such a 
system was the establishment of NATO in 1949. While NATO is important to this work in that it 
solidified the American military commitment to Western Europe, the organization was not 
directly aimed at promoting greater European integration, and thus does not warrant extensive 
analysis here. Alternatively, the French devised the European Defense Community (EDC) as a 
defensive treaty to ensure regional security in response to American calls for West German 
rearmament (Kunz 1953, 275). Although Washington initially worried that the development of a 
European defense system might undermine the power of NATO, policymakers quickly assuaged 
this fear by insisting that the defense cooperation among the Six be fit within the wider NATO 
framework and respect the Atlantic partnership (Lundestad 1998, 78).   
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Realization of the EDC would have achieved the military security and supranational 
design objectives. Secretary of State Dulles worried that NATO was not supranational enough, 
so the EDC offered a welcome solution (Lundestad 1998, 48). Its promotion was the most 
poignant American attempt at achieving a supranational organization for integrated Europe (Van 
der Beugel 1966, 249). The preamble of the EDC Treaty states that the signatories decided to 
enter into the Treaty,  
“Considering that as complete an integration as possible, compatible with military 
requirements, of the human and material elements gathered in their Defense Forces 
within a supranational European organization is the most appropriate means of reaching 
this goal with all the necessary rapidity and effectiveness; Certain that such integration 
will result in the most rational and economic utilization of the resources of their 
countries, as a result, particularly, of the establishment of a common budget and of 
common armament programs…” (Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community 
1952).  
 
In addition to this explicit enumeration of the proposed supranational nature of the Community 
in the treaty’s opening lines, the treaty goes on to eliminate all national armies. Instead, it 
proposes the Members work together to create a common, supranational European army (Kunz 
1953, 277).   
 Despite strong US support, on August 30, 1954, the French National Assembly refused to 
ratify the treaty. The US spent roughly four years vehemently and overtly supporting the EDC. 
So, when the French failed to ratify, it tempered the United States’ position of power. Whether 
due to inadequate mechanisms of control or if the incentives for non-compliance were too strong, 
the principal was unable to secure the desired action from its agents.      
Strategy 
 Uncertainty regarding how actors on both sides of the Atlantic would react to particular 
actions surrounded the implementation of the Marshall Plan. In the case of the EDC, the 
American objectives were not at all ambiguous; the US made it explicit that it wanted the 
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ratification of the EDC Treaty. Yet despite this overt iteration of US preferences, the European 
agents continuously refused and delayed ratification. The relevant strategic interaction variable 
in this scenario then, is the Europeans’, and the French more specifically, beliefs about the 
American objectives. In particular, how important was ratification of the EDC to the Americans, 
and if those in Western Europe chose non-compliance, how would the US react to such an upset?  
Given their eventual refusal to ratify, this question is of the greatest importance in examining the 
French case. The transparency of the American position regarding the EDC put the US in a 
position of weakness, particularly with the French who were aware that their participation in a 
system of regional collective security was strongly desired if not necessary. The French 
government knew it could leverage this position to gain important concessions from the 
Americans, but was unsure just how far it could push the US before Washington would make 
arrangements that excluded France entirely (Konde 2013, 28).  
 Early on in the EDC’s development, the US still held obvious power. At a North Atlantic 
Council Meeting in September of 1950, Secretary of State Acheson told the Europeans that if 
they wished to continue receiving American financial and military aid, they needed to create a 
European defense force that included West German units (Creswell 2002, 100). While France 
vetoed West German membership in NATO, the French responded to this American call for 
German rearmament with the Pleven Plan (Creswell 2002, 101). The Pleven Plan was designed 
to curb any potential negative consequences of a German revitalization: linking Germany to the 
rest of the continent through a supranational organization enabled economic and military rebirth 
while minimizing the likelihood of violent resurgence (Kunz 1953, 275). The Plan quickly 
passed the French National Assembly by a large majority, 343 to 225 votes (Creswell 2002, 
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102). By promoting a European army, France could please the United States while denying West 
Germany an independent military. The Pleven Plan eventually evolved into the EDC Treaty. 
 Yet the momentum behind the Plan died quickly and the Truman Administration 
encountered many delays in securing the establishment of the EDC. Although they approved the 
Pleven Plan by a wide margin, the French hoped to defer German rearmament until a later date. 
The National Assembly explicitly stated its strong opposition to the reconstitution of a German 
army or any immediate action to this end (Konde 2013, 27). The US faced other obstacles to 
securing a workable version of the Pleven Plan. A December 1950 poll showed that nearly 70 
percent of West Germans opposed rearmament (Creswell 2002, 106). Further, the public 
announcement of the US decision to rearm Germany triggered protests in Moscow; the Soviets 
claimed the rearmament of West Germany violated the demilitarization clause of the Potsdam 
Agreement (Creswell 2002, 107).  
Nevertheless, the Cold War provided the US with strong incentives to rearm West 
Germany. Although the US could have unilaterally done so despite French opposition, 
Washington valued a positive relationship with France. Between 1950 and 1952, the Truman 
Administration treaded lightly, trying not to anger French officials such that they might act 
counter to American interests (Creswell 2002, 105). The US was patient, but persistent. Finally, 
in May of 1952, the Truman Administration managed to secure the signature of the EDC Treaty. 
Yet, the two years that it took the US to win the signatures of the treaty paled in difficulty to 
achieving ratification. After the treaty was signed, it was another two years before the French 
government would even agree to submit the treaty to its National Assembly for consideration 
(Creswell 2002, 108).  
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While in the implementation of the Marshall Plan the United States emphasized respect 
but American superiority, American support of the EDC took a different route. Here, the 
indeterminacy of the European countries, and France in particular, in ratifying a treaty which 
they had already signed caused the United States to operate under the assumption that it needed 
to reinforce its position to its agents by offering encouragement (Marcum 2015, 90). 
Consequently, the United States sought to stress the importance it placed on the ratification of 
the EDC. These reinforcements took three different forms.  
Firstly, the United States attempted a policy of intimidation. The US tried to make it clear 
that if the European agents did not act according to American preferences and ratify the treaty, 
there would be grave consequences. In a December 1953 speech to the North Atlantic Council, 
Secretary of State Dulles expressed the need for EDC ratification, and then proceeded to assert 
that; “if, however, the European Defence Community should not become effective […] That 
would compel an agonising reappraisal of basic United States policy” (Dulles 1953, 238). In 
other words, failure to ratify would compel the United States to turn its back on its European 
allies. Congressional hearings concerning the passage of the 1954 appropriations bill for the 
Mutual Security Act echoed similar sentiments. Either the Europeans ratified the EDC, or the US 
would make alternate plans (Cong. Rec. 1954, 9181). Moreover, after it became clear that France 
was the holdout, the US concentrated its efforts on the other five members of the Community; 
the Benelux countries, Italy, and West Germany. If France refused to ratify, it would be 
disruptive to European politics and viewed as an embarrassing political blunder on the part of the 
French government (Van der Beugel 1966, 291). The US hoped that inspiring fear in its agents 
would catalyze favorable action.  
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Second, the US tried to make aid contingent upon ratification. The Richards Amendment 
to the Mutual Security Act stipulated that unless the EDC went into effect, 50 percent of aid 
would be cut off. The American desire to see the EDC come to fruition was so strong that the 
amendment even forbade supplying the full amount of aid to individual states that had ratified: it 
was all or nothing (Cong. Rec. 1954, 9193). Eventually, the US delivered aid to those states that 
had done their part in ratifying, seeking to incentivize the states straggling behind. Yet, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee still approved an amendment to the Mutual Security Act 
appropriations bill of 1954 denying US aid to those countries that failed to ratify the EDC, or an 
acceptable alternative, by December 31, 1954 (Van der Beugel 1966, 291). 
  While Congress looked more favorably upon making aid contingent in the case of EDC 
ratification than it had concerning the Marshall Plan, the strategy was still met with some 
resistance. Representative Fulton expressed this opposition as follows;  
“We should say to these European countries, we want you to join in a collective defense 
security pact of some kind, and we will give you aid to help you, and ask that you adopt a 
feasible course which the President feels is satisfactory and will protect the aid the United 
States taxpayers give you. We should not insist rigidly on the EDC as the only course, or 
aid will be cut off. This is not fair nor is it realistic” (Cong. Rec. 1954, 9194).  
 
Given this sentiment, the United States employed a final strategy to encourage the 
ratification of the treaty: offering important concessions to those nations who showed their 
support by ratifying. For example, passing the revision to the Richards Amendment, which 
allowed aid distribution to those countries who had ratified the treaty (Cong. Rec. 1954, 9193). 
Additionally, after the FRG approved the EDC on March 14, 1953, the United States showed its 
appreciation. Washington pledged substantial military aid to its German contingents as well as 
economic aid to Berlin. The US also offered its assistance to help resettle German refugees and 
even agreed to reconsider the status of German war criminals (Van der Beugel 1966, 290). 
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Eisenhower also tried concessions to appease French Prime Minister Laniel. Laniel told US 
officials that before he would submit the treaty to the legislature, Washington needed to make 
certain guarantees. He demanded a pledge of close ties between the EDC and the UK, an Anglo-
American commitment to not withdraw their forces from NATO after its 20-year expiration date, 
a favorable settlement of the Saar dispute, and maintenance of French power in European affairs. 
Laniel intimated that without these assurances, the treaty would fail in the French National 
Assembly. Eisenhower dutifully provided the assurances that were within his control (Creswell 
2002, 114).  
Yet, the US had to draw the line somewhere. Mendès-France, the new French Prime 
Minister, arrived at the August 1954 Brussels Conference with a list of proposed changes to the 
EDC Treaty (Creswell 2002, 117). The US determined that in addition to the proposals 
themselves being unacceptable, these changes were so drastic that they would demand 
reconsideration of the treaty by national parliaments, causing an unacceptable delay in 
ratification. The US refused to support the French proposals (Dillon 1954, 562), and encouraged 
the other states to be uncompromising as well (Konde 2013, 28). The Conference denied 
Mendès-France’s proposals, but he submitted the treaty to the National Assembly without any 
amendments anyways, knowing well that the legislature was hostile to the treaty in its original 
form. The National Assembly struck down the treaty by 55 votes (Creswell 2002, 117). Despite 
its use of intimidation, applying contingency, and offering concessions, the United States tried 
without success to entice its agents in Europe to bring the EDC to fruition.  
Objective #1: Closer Cooperation 
After the French failed to ratify, US policy did not undergo an “agonizing reappraisal,” as 
Dulles had once suggested. The US and others in Europe still believed that West German 
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rearmament was absolutely essential. Eisenhower was ready to proceed without the French as 
early as September 3, just days after the EDC defeat. Rightfully worried that the rejection of the 
EDC would not stop the Americans and British from rearming the FRG, France proposed the 
Western European Union (WEU) (Creswell 2002, 119). In December of 1954, just months after 
rejecting the EDC, the French National Assembly ratified the Paris Accords, establishing the 
WEU and admitting the FRG into NATO.  
In this sense, the failure of the EDC did not necessarily represent a defeat for the 
integration objective. The signing of the Paris Accords brought all allied forces in Europe under 
a central command, the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR) (Van der Beugel 
1966, 268). Yet, had the EDC been ratified, the supranational organization of the Community 
united by one European army would have marked a much greater step towards collaboration.  
Objective #2: Transatlantic Orientation 
Even initial discussions of a European defense system made clear that such a system 
would never be autonomous; all movement towards collective European defense was to occur 
within the institutional confines of NATO. The SACEUR, an American, would have all 
European military units at his disposal, and be in complete control of all European forces (Kunz 
1953, 276). Furthermore, when the US proposed German inclusion into NATO in September of 
1950, it also advocated increasing American assistance, thus cementing American military 
assistance in Europe (Fleischer 2015, 113).  
The failure of the EDC did not lead to a weakening of transatlantic orientation in Europe. 
Instead, it reinforced the importance of NATO. Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty, 
which established the WEU, compels all signatories to the treaty and any institutional organs that 
they create to work in close cooperation with NATO. The provision goes on to underscore the 
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superiority of NATO, stating that the WEU “will rely on the appropriate military authorities of 
NATO for information and advice on military matters” (Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Collaboration 1954, Art. IV). Only under NATO’s supervision were Germany and Italy able to 
rebuild their defense capabilities (Fleischer 2015, 2). Moreover, the reliance on NATO that 
prevailed after the EDC’s defeat demonstrates a pattern in the integration process that persists 
today: the EU institutions of today only deal with “low-level” issues, while transatlantic 
institutions, like NATO, attend to matters of “high-level” security (Fleischer 2015, 91). Thus, 
despite the failings of the EDC, transatlantic orientation prevailed.  
Objective #3: European Reconstruction 
Whereas the Marshall Plan facilitated economic reconstruction, support of the EDC was 
aimed at achieving security reconstruction. Put another way, the EDC was supposed to decrease 
Western Europe’s reliance on the United States for the maintenance of its physical security. To 
this effect, promotion of the EDC did not entirely fail. Despite the French refusal of the EDC, the 
subsequent signing of the Paris Accords rearmed West Germany and admitted it into NATO. The 
signatories of the WEU treaty agreed to mutual assistance in the event of an attack, thus 
strengthening the collective European defense system (Fleischer 2015, 134). While American 
officials always understood that the EDC would in effect be a part of NATO, the US hoped that 
in its realization, the European states would adopt a greater responsibility in their own military 
security. Particularly, the United States hoped to see a European defense system strong enough to 
deter Soviet aggression, such that the US could lessen its military commitment in Europe 
(Creswell 2002, 121). As the EDC was never realized and NATO, as well as the American 
military presence, took on increased importance, the US did not elicit success in its attempts to 
establish the restoration of self-maintained security in Europe.  
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Objective #4: American Preeminence  
Throughout the ratification process, the US sought to use its political and economic 
power to elicit compliance. The US believed its relative dominance was so great that, when it 
came down to it, the European states would not dare oppose American policy. The US so 
vehemently supported the EDC because it believed the eventual realization would confer real 
benefits to the United States. Primarily, it would feature a supranational construction, an 
outspoken US policy goal, and lessen the American military burden in Europe by building up 
conventional European forces. For these reasons, the United States put the full force of its 
support behind the EDC, as opposed to behind the creation of a European defense force in 
general. The Eisenhower Administration relied on the perceived American prestige and refused 
to consider alternatives to the EDC (Creswell 2002, 115).  
Some scholars have claimed that the overt American support for the Community partly 
perpetrated its detriment (Van der Beugel 1966, Klemm 2016). The rejection of the EDC 
represented a resurgence of French nationalism (Dillon 1954, 603), which can, at least in part, be 
attributed to France’s dislike for America’s interference in European affairs. France, and General 
de Gaulle in particular, favored a French-led, protectionist Europe. Greater certainty regarding 
the principal’s objectives increases the likelihood that agents will leverage this knowledge to 
secure more preferred outcomes: this was the downfall of the EDC. Those who resented 
American power had the opportunity to deny the principal its objective (Van der Beugel 1966, 
300). The EDC failure substantially hurt American prestige. Although the US initially opposed 
the WEU for its lack supranationalism, the blow to American power and the lack of any other 
acceptable alternative offered the United States no choice but to go along with the French 
solution (Creswell 2002, 120).  
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Yet, while the US had certainly suffered a weakening of power, the collapse of the EDC 
did not entirely diminish American dominance. The strength of American pressure for a German 
solution provoked the reversal of French policy; from ardently opposing German rearmament 
and a European defense system, to proposing and ratifying the WEU (Creswell 2002, 91). 
Furthermore, the failure of the EDC demonstrates European dependence on the US. The 
Europeans desperately wanted to retain a strong American military presence in Europe. In failing 
to ratify the EDC Treaty, increase European conventional forces, or demonstrate military 
stability, Europe effectively proved that it needed the US to continue security assistance and 
sustain a military presence in Western Europe (Creswell 2002, 122).  
Changing times, strategies, and outcomes 
 The reasons that the US was able to elicit compliance in the implementation of the 
Marshall Plan but failed so damagingly in the case of the EDC are complex. Three fundamental 
differences between these two policy programs led to America’s implementation of different 
strategies and primarily work to explain the drastic difference in results.  
 The first factor is the relative balance of power on the two sides of the Atlantic. In 1947, 
the US was the only reliable creditor available and the European economies desperately needed 
funds (Lundestad 2003, 46). As such, the Europeans relied heavily on the United States and 
therefore bent to American demands to gain access to US aid. In 1952, however, the financial 
situation had changed. The European economies were no longer on the brink of collapse 
(Bossuat 2008, 13), and thus no longer so dependent on the US. This change made compliance 
with American preferences less important and consequently less likely.  
 Secondly, the locus of control for the Marshall Plan was in the United States, while that 
of the European Defense Community was in Europe. The US Congress determined whether and 
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how much Marshall aid to extend, putting the European agents at the mercy of American 
policymakers. This setup put the command center in Washington and enabled the US to leverage 
its dominance to encourage Europe to act according to American policy preferences. Conversely, 
in the case of the EDC, the European agents held the center of control. Although the US made its 
preference for a supranational European defense force clear, the United States could not directly 
affect the realization of this objective. Instead, it had to motivate its agents to act accordingly.  
 Finally, the two programs advocated integration differently. On the one hand, the 
Marshall Plan encouraged integration more generally, using American aid as an incentive to 
achieve it. On the other hand, in their support of the EDC, the US supported a specific policy, 
offering no alternatives. With the Marshall Plan, the US was much more willing to let impetus 
arise within Europe and was more likely to concede specific provisions to further the integration 
goal in general. These drastically different strategies led to radically different outcomes.  
 The combination of changing power dynamics, different centers of command, and 
fundamentally different objectives led the United States to employ different strategies and 
different mechanisms of control in the two programs. In implementing the Marshall Plan, 
American policymakers were sensitive to the fragility of European sovereignty. They chose to 
offer friendly advice rather than make specific demands and stayed away from making aid 
explicitly contingent on integration progress. Yet, the US was still able to elicit progress towards 
integration by only authorizing aid distribution through collaborative organizations and generally 
leveraging America’s economic dominance. The United States used the promise of financial aid 
and its hegemonic position to elicit compliance. Conversely, in supporting the EDC, the United 
States opted for a more hostile strategy. The US tried to reinforce its agents towards compliance 
through making aid contingent on ratification, offering concessions, and using intimidation 
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tactics. In this scenario, the US used all three of the mechanisms of control at its disposal: 
financial aid, military security, and its hegemonic position, to encourage compliance.  
Legacies  
Ultimately, the Marshall Plan strategy won out while the aggressive efforts to promote 
the EDC fell short. In June of 1987, President Reagan made an address in which he discussed the 
impressive legacy of the Marshall Plan. He discussed how, through the Plan and under American 
direction, Europeans found common ground with one another, defeated protectionist and 
isolationist tendencies, and developed economic and political relationships that catalyzed future 
progress (Reagan 1987). The Marshall Plan was a cooperative and collaborative venture, fusing 
the two sides of the Atlantic in a partnership that still exists today. The ERP demanded that the 
European states cooperate with American interests and simultaneously ensured that US 
policymakers were in tune with local conditions in Europe. For example, ERP administrators 
were sensitive to European preferences to avoid creating an opening for communist support 
(Hunt 2007, 168).    
Moreover, the Marshall Plan facilitated and demanded the creation of collaborative 
regional organizations like the OEEC, which established the foundation for what is today the 
OECD. Through the Marshall Plan, the Europeans were able to combat the problems of 
nationalism and work towards greater unity (Bossaut 2008, 23). The emphasis that the Marshall 
Plan put on harmonizing Western Europe as one, cohesive region, “…helped in turn lay the 
foundation for the integration of Western European economies and the creation of the institutions 
that would eventually become part of today’s European Union” (Morella 2008, 6).  
While both sides of the Atlantic generally remember the Marshall Plan as a success, the 
European Defense Community does not hold such a positive legacy. The EDC’s failure marked a 
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defeat to the progress of integration and to the American prestige. When the US did not follow 
through with its threats to reevaluate policy after the EDC failed, America’s word lost some of 
its credibility. After the embarrassment of being unable to secure ratification through overt 
pressure, the US opted to try and influence European policymakers from the background. The 
United States henceforth transitioned from promoting American initiatives to simply supporting 
European efforts towards integration (Van der Beugel 1966, 301).  
In part, external circumstances, such as the US’ deteriorating balance of payments, 
caused this changing nature of the American role in the integration process. While the American 
strategy evolution was not entirely a result of its failure to elicit the desired action from its 
European agents, the blow to American prestige was strong. In the case of the EDC, the French 
were able to actually dictate policy to the United States (Creswell 2002, 123). Displaying such 
strong support for the EDC revealed American vulnerabilities on which the French capitalized. 
This forever changed the balance of power relationship between the US and its agents, as the 
relationship transitioned from being characterized by American leadership to a rhetoric 
advocating interdependence and equality (Van der Beugel 1966, 384).   
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Chapter 5: Legacies of American Involvement in European 
Integration 
 
 Throughout the course of this thesis, I have established the profound impact that 
America’s pro-integration policy had on the European integration scheme between 1945 and 
1968. During this time period, the five successive presidential administrations advocated a policy 
of leveraging the United States’ dominant position in the world power structure to promote a 
European integration that would be beneficial to American objectives. This policy had four 
underlying sub-motives: economic reconstruction, military security, supranational design, and an 
Atlantic partnership. Through policies aimed at achieving these motivations, the US sought to 
encourage its overarching aspiration of integration. In examining US policy and its effects on the 
integration progress, it is important to understand the contemporary Western European-US 
relationship. The Principal-Agent Model offers a nuanced view of this relationship, allowing us 
to consider how the United States attempted to achieve policy objectives over which it had no 
direct control. The actual mechanisms on which American policy relied can be easily analyzed 
through the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the strong American support of the 
European Defense Community. These two case studies enable me to contemplate how the United 
States pursued its preferences while at the whim of its European allies, and then consider which 
strategies yielded success. While it is useful to consider the achievement of American objectives 
in individual circumstances, it is also important to look at the success of American policy 
overall.  
Consequently, this final chapter considers the lasting impact of America’s 1945-1968 
European policy. This chapter presents an analysis of the success of this policy, by considering 
the extent to which the United States was able to elicit the achievement of its objectives. In other 
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words, how successful was the United States in encouraging the European states to implement an 
integration scheme that was domestically advantageous? Next, this chapter examines how the 
legacy of American involvement in the early stages of integration manifests itself in the present 
construction of Europe. Finally, I assess the transatlantic relationship of the twenty-first century, 
as it relates to America’s initial involvement in European integration.  
The United States of Europe: by America, for America? 
Between 1945 and 1968, officials in Washington supported a variety of different policies 
to encourage their allies in Europe to act according to American preferences. To make 
overarching and long-run judgements about American success, this section considers the 
integration process as a whole, rather than individual policies or programs, as prior chapters have 
done. The methodology, however, remains constant. I will break the US integration objective 
down into its four discernable components and compare the stated objective to the results. 
Through this type of analysis, I conclude that the United States elicited substantial success in its 
pursuit of a reconstructed, integrated, and Atlantic-oriented Europe. From a broad historical 
view, the Europe that emerged generally, if only weakly, meets all of the United States’ stated 
goals.  
Objective #1: Closer Cooperation 
In terms of cooperation, the United States had high hopes. It sought a political union and 
a common market. Essentially, the US wanted to see a federalist Europe, modeled off of the 
United States. The Europe that emerged fell short of this hope (Lundestad 1989, 130). In general, 
the European states were disinclined to give up any sovereignty. In the European Union (EU) of 
today, this reluctance has meant sustained fragmentation of European policies: twenty-eight 
autonomous national governments need to coordinate to establish effective European policy. 
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Among other things, the EU lacks a harmonized fiscal policy or legal system (Berend 2016, 
106). The absence of such coordination substantially hinders Europe’s ability to cooperate as an 
effective and cohesive unit. Nevertheless, the American push for integration led to the immense 
progress in cooperation that characterized the 1950s and 1960s (Berend 2016, 231). For example, 
American policy regarding Germany, based on the understanding that integration could limit 
future German aggression, was wholly important to the integration process. Thanks to this 
policy, West Germany was rearmed, the ECSC was established, and France and Germany 
reached reconciliatory status, allowing fear of resurgent violence to subside. Without these 
developments, Europe could not have achieved the degree of cooperation it possesses today.  
In 1985, the Schengen Agreement was signed, eventually eliminating border controls 
among signatories. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty led to the establishment of the Eurozone: a 
common currency zone governed by a common central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), 
and a common monetary policy. Today, the EU has twenty-eight member countries, although in 
March 2017 the UK provided formal notification of its intended departure. The Member States 
collaborate on a variety of different policy issues, including a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). The governing structure of the EU, while weakened by uncoordinated national 
policies, still represents a degree of cooperation that was unthinkable in 1945. The four European 
decision-making bodies; the European Parliament, the European Council, the European 
Commission, and the Council of the European Union, are highly collaborative and somewhat 
supranational. Furthermore, these institutions are representative governmental bodies. The 
European Council, Commission, and the Council of the European Union are all comprised of one 
representative from each Member State. The European Parliament is proportionally 
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representative, consisting of Member State representatives allocated by population (European 
Commission 2018).  
Total political nor economic unity exists today. Yet despite the weaknesses of the 
European integration progress, the scheme has greatly advanced since the idea was initially 
proposed. Europeans engage in a substantially greater degree of regional consideration in the 
formulation of national policies today than in 1945. Moreover, the European institutions 
themselves, as well as the cooperation that they foster, are certainly indicative of positive steps 
towards the achievement of the US objective to elicit heightened European cooperation.  
Objective #2: Transatlantic Orientation  
As internal integration in Europe is far from perfect, so too is transatlantic integration. US 
pro-integration policy sought the birth of an advantageous trading partner. Despite this goal, 
American and Western European economic interests have often been at odds. The establishment 
of the EEC in 1957 unleashed long-suppressed American fears that the region’s harsh external 
trade barriers and preferential trade agreements would detrimentally exclude American goods 
from the European market (Alcaro et. al. 2016, 170). With mixed results, the US has repeatedly 
had to fight for increased access to the European market (Lundestad 1989, 114). Yet, today, the 
US and the EU have the world’s most integrated economic relationship, and US-EU trade is the 
largest bilateral trade relationship in the world (European Commission 2017). The great degree 
of interdependence of economies has also empowered the other side’s interests in becoming 
important players in domestic politics (Peterson & Steffenson 2009, 32).  
For decades, administrations in the US and Europe have worked to institutionalize this 
partnership, but the system of international anarchy obstructs success on this front. Much like its 
European allies, the United States has been reluctant to give up sovereignty to supranational 
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institutions (Lundestad 1989, 150). Washington opposed any credible commitments that linked 
the two sides of the Atlantic if they diminished America’s sovereignty. The United States has 
tried repeatedly to augment formal links between the two sides of the Atlantic, but most attempts 
have been merely symbolic. Multiple proposals for an Atlantic Union were submitted to 
Congress in the 1950s (Lundestad 1989, 147), Kennedy urged an Atlantic Partnership (Van der 
Beugel 1966, 371), and the HW Bush administration proposed the Transatlantic Declaration 
(Lundestad 1989, 114), which was then rebranded as the New Transatlantic Agenda by the 
Clinton administration (Lundestad 1989, 124). Although all of these programs have been 
effectively weakened by nationalistic tendencies, neither side is willing to give up on the 
prospect for eventual institutionalization (Peterson & Steffenson 2009, 30). The US and the EU 
hold joint summits roughly annually, and meetings between officials from EU Member States 
and the US are held even more frequently. The two bodies are committed to common goals on a 
variety of issues, such as security (Peterson & Steffenson 2009, 33).  
Objective #3: European Reconstruction  
Arguably, the United States achieved the greatest success in its efforts to rebuild Western 
Europe to a state of prosperity. The Marshall Plan facilitated the reconstruction of the Western 
European economies and set them on track for sustained growth (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 
4). By the program’s effective end in October of 1951, the national income per capita in Western 
Europe surpassed pre-war levels by more than ten percent (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 23). 
Post-World War II economic growth in Western Europe was far more than simply 
reconstruction; the region underwent a period of “supergrowth”, thanks in part to Marshall aid. 
Through restoring financial stability and free market forces, as well as through initiating a 
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sociocultural foundation upon which future growth was based, American policy played a crucial 
role in European economic recovery (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 43). 
In addition to facilitating the economic reconstruction of Western Europe, the United 
States enabled Europe to prosper militarily, socially, and politically as well. Through preserving 
the European economies, the Marshall Plan enabled the restoration of political stability in 
Western Europe. Western Germany was rearmed through NATO supervision and with funds 
provided by the US, enabling Western Europe to regain a semblance of independent security. 
Moreover, by alleviating the sense of total destruction, the US enabled Europe’s cultural and 
social life to flourish once again. 
Objective #4: Facilitating American Preeminence  
The final dimension of US pro-integration policy was the desire to support a united 
Europe that would ultimately benefit American interests and respect American superiority. 
Despite the shortcomings in the other objective areas, it is in this final realm that the outcome 
diverged most significantly from US intentions. Largely beginning in the 1970s, the United 
States started to understand that Western Europe was not simply an ally, but also an increasingly 
menacing competitor: Europe’s economy really began to gain strength relative to the United 
States’ (Berend 2016, 123). Europe also posed a challenge to US interests outside of the 
economic sphere. For example, when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, Western Europe and the 
United States had opposing views concerning how to address the new German problem (Alcaro 
et. al. 2016, 177). More recently, Europe strongly opposed the US invasion of Iraq and frustrated 
the Obama Administration with its lackluster contributions to NATO (Alcaro 2016, 184-6). As 
such, the new construction of Europe is neither entirely complementary to American objectives, 
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nor wholly subordinate to American preeminence. Evidently, the US was unable to secure an 
incontrovertibly beneficial partner across the Atlantic.  
Nevertheless, the EU and the US are each other’s most valuable allies (Peterson & 
Steffenson 2009). Historically, the two have backed each other up on economic, security, 
political, and social issues alike. Further, many scholars have claimed that the legacies of 
European dependence are still very much alive today; that there is no such thing as a Europe 
without America (Dumbrell 2002, Shapiro & Paradijs 2017). Even in the age of President 
Trump, when American involvement in Europe is rife with uncertainty, Europeans still look to 
the US for cues and support. Creating a partner who would unequivocally support American 
interests was unrealistic. Necessarily, Europe and the US are going to diverge on some issues. 
Yet, the US came remarkably close to its seemingly impossible goal. In fostering the new 
Europe, the US created a partner who is uncommonly supportive and often facilitates and 
supports the advancement of domestic gains.  
Thus, a broad overview of the integration progress in Europe reveals that the United 
States achieved its objectives. The European Union enjoys a great degree of prosperity and is 
more internally collaborative today than was thought possible in 1945. Moreover, Western 
Europe is constantly and intensely engaged with the US on a multitude of issues, on which it 
generally supports domestic gains for the US.  
America’s Role in Shaping the Europe of Today  
 It would be pure speculation to make claims about what Europe would look like today in 
the absence of US involvement in the immediate post-War decades, or to try and quantify the 
degree that this involvement has influenced the present-day construction of Europe. 
Nevertheless, the US was significantly and undeniably influential in the integration process. 
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Indeed, American proposals initiated the first pertinent step towards a new, integrated Europe 
(Schmitt 1962, 30). Although Europeans generally supported the integration objective early on, 
they faced too much devastation at the end of the War to take any actionable steps towards 
reconstruction or integration on their own; they needed the push as well as the aid from the US. 
Europe responded to US calls for integration and pursued policies that would satisfy American 
policymakers, so as to ensure continued flow of aid (Schmitt 1962, 30). The development of 
NATO further proves the reliance on US assistance for European survival (Schmitt 1962, 37). It 
would be easy to play this game all day: listing all the instances of US involvement without 
which, present-day Europe would be different. Instead, it is useful to consider how the history of 
the American leadership role in integration manifests itself today.   
 Today, the United States is still an important actor in furthering the integration scheme. 
The promotion of American thought patterns has forged greater cooperation across the Atlantic. 
For example, the US became intensely occupied with homeland security after 9/11. In the United 
States’ attempts to push Europe to achieve similar security standards, the US has actually 
fostered greater security policy coordination among EU Member-States (Peterson & Steffenson 
2009, 33). Additionally, the US has encouraged the EU to think of itself as a cohesive political 
unit. Largely beginning during the Clinton Administration, US policy often treats the European 
Union as a single actor, rather than individual, sovereign countries. This treatment furthers the 
conception of the EU as a single identity in the minds of Europeans (Peterson & Pollack 2003, 
5).  
The current construction of Europe is largely a product of European efforts. For example, 
the Maastricht Treaty, which formally founded the EU, was a European program (Alcaro et. al. 
2016, 176).  Yet, the US pledged strong support for the further integration (Lundestad 1989, 
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116). After the treaty was signed, President HW Bush expressed America’s joy for the “historic 
steps toward economic and political union,” explaining that European unity is beneficial to 
Europe, the Atlantic partnership, and the entire world order (Bush 1991). He went on to take 
some of the credit in this milestone, stating; 
America can take pride in its contributions to Europe’s success. The U.S. engagement on 
that continent has yielded many benefits for the Europeans and for us. […] We are 
intimately connected to what happens in Europe and beyond. Now, we are getting an 
even stronger European partner (Bush 1991).  
 
While Bush’s comments may seem somewhat egotistical, he is not wrong. The US played an 
important role in the integration process, one that should not be carelessly overlooked in 
celebrating its successes. In 2000, Bill Clinton was awarded the Charlemagne Prize, an award for 
progressive work done in pursuit of European integration and unification (Peterson & Pollack 
2003, 5). Although Clinton was the first American president to receive the honor, he was 
certainly not the first American president to be instrumental in the integration process.  
Twenty-First Century Transatlantic Relations 
Examining the modern conception of the transatlantic relationship reveals the lasting 
importance of America’s initial influence and objectives. The US continues to view European 
unity and further integration as something desirable, insofar as it would bring domestic 
advantages. A more united Europe, not bogged down by the coordination of twenty-eight 
different national governments, would be able to act more decisively and therefore be a more 
effective partner to the US in global affairs. Yet, unlike the nearly impenetrable support of the 
Truman through the Johnson Administrations, support is now tempered by concerns about the 
domestic downsides of European integration: what happens when Europe opposes American 
interests (Mix 2013, 23)?  
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When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the European public feared that the American role in 
Europe would fall with it. Contrary to this prediction, the US has remained intimately involved 
in European affairs and essential to European security and prosperity (Lagadec 2012, 18). Given 
this lasting American impact, Europe was generally displeased with the election of George W. 
Bush, a president regarded as touting an “America First”, unilateralist approach to foreign policy 
(Dumbrell 2002, 279). Bush’s tendency towards unilateralism to solve international issues 
angered his European allies. In particular, his disregard for international protocols in his pursuit 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom caused a great rift across the Atlantic. Yet, supporters of the Bush 
Administration have argued that, while the Europeans are quick to condemn Bush as isolationist, 
Europe is overwhelmingly internally-oriented as well (Zakaria 2001). In this sense, legacies are 
left over from the immediate post-war period: “free-riding Europeans still look to the US for 
leadership and ultimate security, despite efforts at integrating their own defences” (Dumbrell 
2002, 283). 
Allies across the ocean welcomed President Obama’s investiture in 2009. Obama 
operated under the belief that Europe needed to be treated “not as a problem but as a partner” 
(Grevi 2016, 10). In other words, the Obama Administration felt that Europe had progressed to a 
point where it no longer required the US to facilitate its growth. Instead, the Administration 
hoped to rely on its long-time ally as a partner in shaping the new world order. While this policy 
could be seen as an empowering message for Europeans, Obama’s European policy was met 
with disappointment. It soon became clear that Obama was interested in diminishing US 
involvement in Europe because he wanted to pivot towards Asia instead (Grevi 2016, 2). 
Nevertheless, the US returned to Europe to protect its old friend, as successive crises threatened 
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to topple the continent. This refocusing confirmed a worry that many Americans have held for 
decades: Europe is unable to manage its own affairs without US support (Grevi 2016, 10).  
Transatlantic relations did, however, see some positive progress during the Obama 
Administration. In 2013, the US and EU began negotiations on a bilateral free trade and 
investment agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The TTIP 
sought to further liberalize both commercial and financial Atlantic trade, as well harmonize 
judicial and security policies. The goal was to eventually develop complete mobility of goods 
and capital across the two continents (Mot 2014, 127). The pursuit of this policy has an 
interesting familiarity. Today, the US no longer holds hegemonic status: other players on the 
world stage threaten its economic superiority. In the TTIP’s aspirations to combine the US and 
EU markets, the US would cement its dominant position in the world market: the agreement 
would completely reconfigure the world economic order, empowering the US to protect its geo-
strategic position as a superpower (Mot 2014, 139). The TTIP negotiations were put on hold 
after President Trump was elected, but some US officials have indicated they are still interested 
in discussing the trade agreement (LaRocco 2017).  
President Trump’s election in 2016 changed the foreign policy field. Europe was 
concerned with Trump’s unexpected win, based on his “Make America Great Again” platform, 
(Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 2). In a December 2017 National Security Address, Trump took credit 
for the increase in European spending on NATO, stating it was “because [he] would not allow 
member states to be delinquent in the payment while we guarantee their safety and are willing to 
fight wars for them” (Trump, 2017). Indeed, throughout the first year of his presidency, Trump’s 
rhetoric has repeatedly suggested that he is not interested in maintaining the benevolent 
transatlantic relationship, nor continuing to defend our European allies. In his first NATO 
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meeting in Brussels in May 2017, Trump refused to reaffirm the mutual security pledge 
enshrined in Article 5 of the 1949 Treaty. In effect, this refusal signaled to European allies that 
the US would not assuredly provide its military forces in case of an attack on another NATO 
member (Pifer 2017). This fear is particularly potent because Trump’s campaign often insisted 
that the US would back out of Europe if the continent did not solve its many crises (Shapiro & 
Paradijs 2017, 10).  
Just days after the NATO meeting, German Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed that it 
was time that “we Europeans must really take fate into our own hands” (Smale & Erlanger 
2017). Trump’s first year in office has pivoted America’s transatlantic policy, rejecting the 
longstanding notion that American leadership is necessary for the maintenance of global stability 
(Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 11). Trump’s focus on domestic concerns have proven American 
support in Europe unreliable and consequently, his presidency has fostered discussion of a “post-
American Europe”. This debate hints that any such construction would rely on greater integration 
of and consensus among the European states (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 13).  Interestingly 
enough, it seems that Trump’s attempts to secure American dominance by turning away from its 
European allies may actually have the effect of strengthening the EU, by forcing the Member 
States to engage in closer cooperation.   
The European Foreign Relations Council notes that perhaps Trump’s “America First” 
rhetoric was so troubling to the Europeans because “the nations of Europe rely on America for its 
security and America does not rely on Europe” (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 2). This asymmetry in 
dependence has characterized transatlantic relations since the end of World War II. American 
influence is embedded in the fabric of European society. This importance is evidenced by the 
popularity of American television, the broad reach of American companies, the pervasive nature 
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of the English language, and the overwhelming knowledge of and attention to American politics 
and economics in Europe (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 9). No administration nor policy blunders 
can erase the history of dependence, friendship, and connectivity between the two continents.  
Despite how the Europeans feel about current and future American policy or American 
presidents, they remain in a position of reliance: European dependence on the US renders the 
continent in a permanent relationship of dependency with the United States. Although the US 
ultimately failed in its objective to forge a united Europe who is incontrovertibly complementary 
to American interests and wholly supportive of US preeminence, Washington came close. For 
the past seventy years, since the end of World War II, the Europeans have relied on the US for 
their physical, economic, and psychological security. While this dependence does not always 
translate to complacency nor compliance, it is symbolic of the lasting impact of American 
involvement in Europe in the decades immediately following World War II.  
  
 
 
84 
References 
 
100.07 Congressional Record. June 29, 1954.  
 
100.07 Congressional Record p. 9194. (Statement by James G. Fulton, PA). June 29, 1954. 
 
Acheson, D. “The Secretary of State to the President.” Jan. 3, 1950. in Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1950, Vol. III: Western Europe, doc. 1. Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 
 
Adams, J. (2018, March 29). Questions concerning the economics of European integration [In-
person]. 
 
Alcaro, R., Peterson, J., & Greco, E. (Eds.). (2016). The West and the global power shift: 
transatlantic relations and global governance. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Berend, T. I. (2016). The history of European integration: a new perspective. London ; New 
York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 
 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). (1950). European Payments Union - A 
Short History. Marriner S. Eccles Papers, 6. 
 
Bossuat, G. (2008). The Marshall Plan: History and Legacy. In Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned 
for the 21st Century (pp. 13–28). OECD. 
 
Bush, G. H.W. “Statement on the European Community Summit.” Dec. 11, 1991. in Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George H.W. Bush. Washington, DC: 
Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Record. 
 
Creswell, M. (2002). Between the Bear and the Phoenix: The United States and the European 
Defense Community, 1950-54. Security Studies, 11(4), 89–124.  
 
DeLong, J. B., & Eichengreen, B. J. (1991). The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful 
Structural Adjustment Program. NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 3899. 
 
Dillon, D. C. “The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State.” Aug. 15, 1954. in 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-54, Vol. V: Western European Security Part 
1, doc. 562. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1983. 
 
Dillon, D. C. “The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State.” Aug. 31, 1954. in 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-54, Vol. V: Western European Security Part 
1, doc. 603. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1983. 
 
 
 
85 
Dobson, A. P. (1995). Anglo-American relations in the twentieth century: of friendship, conflict, 
and the rise and decline of superpowers. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Dulles, J. F. “Statement by the Secretary of State to the North Atlantic Council.” Dec. 14, 1953. 
in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-54, Vol. V: Western European Security 
Part 1, doc. 238. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1983. 
 
Dumbrell, J. (2002). Unilateralism and ‘America First’? President George W. Bush’s Foreign 
Policy. The Political Quarterly, 73(3), 279–287. 
 
Eichengreen, B. J. (2007). The European economy since 1945: coordinated capitalism and 
beyond. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Ellwood, D. W. (1992). Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and postwar 
reconstruction. London ; New York: Longman. 
 
European Commission. (2017, November 6). United States.  
 
European Commission & Directorate-General Communication. (2018). The European Union: 
what it is and what it does. 
 
Fleischer, B. (2015, June 9). A European Army? The European Defense Community and the 
Politics of Transnational Influence in Post-War Europe, 1950-1954. Bremen 
International Graduate School of Social Sciences, Bremen, Germany. 
 
Frieden, J. A. (1999). Actors and Preferences in International Relations. In D. A. Lake & R. 
Powell (Eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton University Press. 
 
Grevi, G. (2016). Lost in transition? US foreign policy from Obama to Trump. European  Policy 
Centre. 
 
Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (Eds.). (2006). Delegation and 
agency in international organizations. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Hoffman, P. (1949, October). Statement by Paul Hoffman at the 75th OEEC Council Meeting. 
Presented at the 75th OEEC Council meeting, Paris. 
 
Holborn, H. (1953). American Foreign Policy and European Integration. World Politics, 6(1), 1–
30.  
 
Hunt, M. H. (2007). The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded 
Global Dominance. University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Kennan, G. “Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan).” May 16, 
1947. in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1947, Vol. III: The British 
Commonwealth; Europe, doc. 134. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972. 
 
 
86 
 
Kennan, G. “The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State.” Feb. 22, 1946. 
in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946, Vol. VI: Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, doc. 475. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1969. 
 
Kennan, G. “The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State 
(Acheson).” May 23, 1947. in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1947, Vol. III: The 
British Commonwealth; Europe, doc. 135. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
1972. 
 
Klemm, D. (2016). An Attempt to Establish the European Army: The Pleven Plan. Journal on 
European History of Law, 7(1), 105–109. 
 
Konde, E. (2013). Pierre Mendès France, French Security Politics, and the European Defense 
Community. Open Journal of Political Science, 3(1), 24–29. 
 
Kunz, J. L. (1953). Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community. The American 
Journal of International Law, 47(2), 275–281. 
 
Lagadec, E. (2012). Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Europe, America and the Rise 
of the Rest. Routledge. 
 
Lake, D. A., & Powell, R. (1999). International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach. In D. 
A. Lake & R. Powell (Eds.), Strategic choice and international relations. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
LaRocco, L. A. (2017, May 30). Wilbur Ross says he’s “open to resuming TTIP negotiations.” 
Retrieved March 15, 2018. 
 
Larres, K. (2009). The United States and European Integration, 1945–1990. In K. Larres (Ed.), A 
Companion to Europe since 1945 (pp. 151–182). Wiley-Blackwell.  
 
Lovett, R. “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France.” Aug. 26, 1947. in Foreign 
Relations of the United States. 1947, Vol. III: The British Commonwealth; Europe, doc. 
229. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972. 
 
Lundestad, G. (1998). Empire by integration: the United States and European integration, 1945-
1997. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lundestad, G. (2003). The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from “empire” by 
invitation to transatlantic drift. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Marcum, A. S. (2015). To Dictate the Peace: Power, Strategy and Success in Military 
Occupations (Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation). University of Maryland, College Park. 
 
 
 
87 
Marshall, George C. “Letter from Secretary of State to Chairman of Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations.” June 4, 1947. in Department of State Bulletin. 1947, Vol. XVI: No. 
409A, p. 1213 Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1947. 
 
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2003). The tragedy of great power politics (1. publ. as a Norton paperback). 
New York, NY: Norton. 
 
“Memorandum of a Conversation.” May 14, 1956. in Foreign Relations of the United States. 
1955-57, Vol. IV: Western European Security and Integration, doc. 172. Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1998. 
 
“Memorandum of a Conversation.” May 4, 1957. in Foreign Relations of the United States. 
1955-57, Vol. XXVI: Central and Southeastern Europe, doc. 105. Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1992. 
 
Miller, G. J. (2005). The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models. Annual Review of 
Political Science, 8(1), 203–225.  
 
Mix, D. E. (2013). The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy. Congressional Research 
Service. 
 
Moravcsik, A. (2013). The Choice for Europe Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht. London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
Morella, C. A. (2008). Marshall Plan 60th Anniversary Symposium: Introductory Remarks. In 
The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the 21st Century (pp. 5–7). OECD. 
 
Mot, A. (2014). The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Journal of Public 
Administration, Finance and Law, (5). 
 
Peterson, J., & Pollack, M. A. (2003). Europe, America, Bush: transatlantic relations in the 
twenty-first century. London; New York: Routledge. 
 
Peterson, J., & Steffenson, R. (2009). Transatlantic Institutions: Can Partnership be Engineered? 
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 11(1), 25–45.  
 
Pifer, S. (2017, May 31). Is Trump undoing trans-Atlantic relations? Brookings.  
 
Rappaport, A. (1981). The United States and European Integration: The First Phase. Diplomatic 
History, 5(2), 121–150.  
 
Reagan, R. (1987). The legacy of the Marshall Plan. Washington D.C.: United States 
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs.  
 
 
 
88 
“Report of the Special ‘Ad Hoc’ Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.” 
Apr. 21, 1947. in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1947, Vol. III: The British 
Commonwealth; Europe, doc. 132. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972. 
 
Ricardo, D. (1817). On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. John Murray. 
 
Rosato, S. (2011). Europe united: power politics and the making of the European Community. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Schmitt, H. A. (1962). The Path to the European Union: from the Marshall Plan to the Common 
Market. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 
 
“Scope Paper Prepared in the Department of State.” June 11, 1962. in Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1961-63, Vol. XIII: Western Europe and Canada, doc. 44. Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1994. 
 
Shapiro, J., & Paradijs, D. (2017). The Transatlantic Meaning of Donald Trump: A US-EU 
Power Audit (No. 232). European Council on Foreign Relations. 
 
Smale, A., & Erlanger, S. (2017, May 28). Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking 
Past Trump. The New York Times.  
 
“The Atlantic Alliance and United States Security.” 1964. Critical Issues Council. Critical Issues 
Paper No. 3, p. 18. Washington: Republican Citizens Committee of the United States, 
1964.  
 
Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community. (1952, May 26). 
 
Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence Signed at 
Brussels on March 17, 1948, as Amended by the “Protocol Modifying and Completing 
the Brussels Treaty” (1954). 
 
Truman, H. S. “Strength of Forces in Western Europe to be Increased.” Sept. 9, 1950. in 
Department of State Bulletin. 1950, Vol. XXIII: No. 574, p. 468 Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1950. 
 
Trump, D. (2017, December). Remarks by President Trump on the Administration’s National 
Security Strategy. Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, 
D.C. 
 
Van der Beugel, E. H. (1966). From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership. Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Publishing Company. 
 
Zakaria, F. (2001, June 18). Holing up inside fortress Europe. Newsweek; New York, 137(25), 25. 
